I still recommend
Subjectively Objective, but I’m no longer confident that your inferential distance from the coverage there is small enough. Perplexed’s recommendation to read all the way through the sequences, or—even better—ET Jaynes’ Probability Theory: The Logic of Science—may be necessary. As he’s said, Critical Rationalism was an important step in the philosophy of science—but the field has moved beyond that to a rigorous, mathematically precise model of the amount of belief any rational agent must hold given identical priors and the same evidence—Popper’s Vs(a)=CT(a)-CTf(a) is not quantitative in this way.
That wasn’t intended to convince you; if you truly wish to subject your conjecture to criticism a contemplative reading of Jaynes is necessary. If you do happen to find Jaynes convincing, all is not lost—we still like Tarski here.
I still recommend Subjectively Objective, but I’m no longer confident that your inferential distance from the coverage there is small enough. Perplexed’s recommendation to read all the way through the sequences, or—even better—ET Jaynes’ Probability Theory: The Logic of Science—may be necessary. As he’s said, Critical Rationalism was an important step in the philosophy of science—but the field has moved beyond that to a rigorous, mathematically precise model of the amount of belief any rational agent must hold given identical priors and the same evidence—Popper’s Vs(a)=CT(a)-CTf(a) is not quantitative in this way.
That wasn’t intended to convince you; if you truly wish to subject your conjecture to criticism a contemplative reading of Jaynes is necessary. If you do happen to find Jaynes convincing, all is not lost—we still like Tarski here.