Not sure what you mean by “the math” exactly. I’ve heard people cite the algorithmic ontology as a motivation for, e.g., logical updatelessness, or for updateless decision theory generally. In the case of logical updatelessness, I think (low confidence!) the idea is that if you don’t see yourself as this physical object that exists in “the real world,” but rather see yourself as an algorithm instantiated in a bunch of possible worlds, then it might be sensible to follow a policy that doesn’t update on e.g. the first digit of pi being odd.
query rephrase: taboo both “algorithmic ontology” and “physicalist ontology”. describe how each of them constructs math to describe things in the world, and how that math differs. That is, if you’re saying you have an ontology, presumably this means you have some math and some words describing how the math relates to reality. I’m interested in a comparison of that math and those words; so far you’re saying things about a thing I don’t really understand as being separate from physicalism. Why can’t you just see yourself as multiple physical objects and still have a physicalist ontology? what makes these things different in some, any, math, as opposed to only being a difference in how the math connects to reality?
I think I just don’t understand / probably disagree with the premise of your question, sorry. I’m taking as given whatever distinction between these two ontologies is noted in the post I linked. These don’t need to be mathematically precise in order to be useful concepts.
There isn’t a difference, though it’s only because algorithms can simulate all of the physical stuff that’s in the physical ontology, and thus the physical ontology is a special case of the algorithmic ontology.
how does a physicalist ontology differ from an algorithmic ontology in terms of the math?
Not sure what you mean by “the math” exactly. I’ve heard people cite the algorithmic ontology as a motivation for, e.g., logical updatelessness, or for updateless decision theory generally. In the case of logical updatelessness, I think (low confidence!) the idea is that if you don’t see yourself as this physical object that exists in “the real world,” but rather see yourself as an algorithm instantiated in a bunch of possible worlds, then it might be sensible to follow a policy that doesn’t update on e.g. the first digit of pi being odd.
query rephrase: taboo both “algorithmic ontology” and “physicalist ontology”. describe how each of them constructs math to describe things in the world, and how that math differs. That is, if you’re saying you have an ontology, presumably this means you have some math and some words describing how the math relates to reality. I’m interested in a comparison of that math and those words; so far you’re saying things about a thing I don’t really understand as being separate from physicalism. Why can’t you just see yourself as multiple physical objects and still have a physicalist ontology? what makes these things different in some, any, math, as opposed to only being a difference in how the math connects to reality?
I think I just don’t understand / probably disagree with the premise of your question, sorry. I’m taking as given whatever distinction between these two ontologies is noted in the post I linked. These don’t need to be mathematically precise in order to be useful concepts.
ah my bad, my attention missed the link! that does in fact answer my whole question, and if I hadn’t missed it I’d have had nothing to ask :)
There isn’t a difference, though it’s only because algorithms can simulate all of the physical stuff that’s in the physical ontology, and thus the physical ontology is a special case of the algorithmic ontology.
Helpful link here to build intuition:
http://www.amirrorclear.net/academic/ideas/simulation/index.html
That’s what I already believed, but OP seems to disagree, so I’m trying to understand what they mean