That’s disagreement about whether anything is wrong, and it isn’t widespread.
You asked for examples of theories where ‘murder’ is not necessarily considered ‘wrong’. I provided you with three, of which two have been at one time or another, or are currently, very widely held. I’ve already understood, thanks to my conversation with thomblake which I linked to earlier, that we aren’t having a substantive disagreement here, so I don’t know what more you want from me.
If there were actual Objective Standards for things, and we could know them, it would be very surprising to me that the world functions the way it does.
..seemed to me to be a standard objection to moral objectivism on the basis of disagreement about first order ethics. I responded that there are aspects of first order ethics that are in fact agreed on by most peopleie murder is wrong, and charity is not-wrong. You then replied in terms of meta ethics. Was that a change of subject, or were you talking about metaethics all along? If the latter, why would metaethics, an academic specaism understood only by a few, affect “the way the world functions”?
I don’t actually recall referring to ethics or metaethics at all, just making an (epistemological? metaphysical? I’m not quite sure what to call it...) claim about my perceptions and beliefs of the difference being at odds with what I would expect to find in a world with Objective Standards. Do you think making that kind of statement thrusts us into a conversation about Ethics, or were just changing the subject when you brought up murder and value judgments? If the former, please let me know what I’m missing here...
A world with objective standards for some things, or nothign, or everything? You were confidently claiming that “crappy” is alwasy subjective. But there are at least some objective standards. Several examples have been given.
You asked for examples of theories where ‘murder’ is not necessarily considered ‘wrong’. I provided you with three, of which two have been at one time or another, or are currently, very widely held. I’ve already understood, thanks to my conversation with thomblake which I linked to earlier, that we aren’t having a substantive disagreement here, so I don’t know what more you want from me.
Your comment:
..seemed to me to be a standard objection to moral objectivism on the basis of disagreement about first order ethics. I responded that there are aspects of first order ethics that are in fact agreed on by most peopleie murder is wrong, and charity is not-wrong. You then replied in terms of meta ethics. Was that a change of subject, or were you talking about metaethics all along? If the latter, why would metaethics, an academic specaism understood only by a few, affect “the way the world functions”?
I don’t actually recall referring to ethics or metaethics at all, just making an (epistemological? metaphysical? I’m not quite sure what to call it...) claim about my perceptions and beliefs of the difference being at odds with what I would expect to find in a world with Objective Standards. Do you think making that kind of statement thrusts us into a conversation about Ethics, or were just changing the subject when you brought up murder and value judgments? If the former, please let me know what I’m missing here...
A world with objective standards for some things, or nothign, or everything? You were confidently claiming that “crappy” is alwasy subjective. But there are at least some objective standards. Several examples have been given.
Hmm. That’s a good point. I’ll have to think on it for a bit and get back to you. :)