The “no permissible state of affairs” idea is also hypothetical necessity: “you must do this, if we want a situation which we call permissible.”
I still don’t think you have made a good case for morality being hypothetical, since you haven’t made a case against the case against. And I still think you need to explain obligatoriness.
In particular, I said that good things tend to make us desire them. You said I had causality reversed there. But I did not: I had it exactly right. Consider survival, which is an obvious case of something good.
Survival is good, you say. If I am in a position to ensure my survival by sacrificing Smith, is it morally good to do so? After all Smith’s survival is just as Good as mine.
I don’t care about “morally-should” as opposed to what I should do.
Doens’t-care is made to care. If you don’t behave as though you care about morality, society will punish you.
However. it won’t punish you for failing to fulfil other shoulds.
I didn’t see any good case against morality being hypothetical, not even in that article.
I did explain obligatoriness. It is obligatory to do something morally good because we don’t have a choice about wanting to do something good. Everyone wants to do that, and the only way you can do that is by doing something morally good.
I did said I do not care about morally-should “as opposed” to what I should do. It could sometimes happen that I should not do something because people will punish me if I do it. In other words, I do care about what I should do, and that is determined by what would be good to do.
I did explain obligatoriness. It is obligatory to do something morally good because we don’t have a choice about wanting to do something good. Everyone wants to do that,
From which it follows that nobody ever fails to do what is morally good, and that their inevitable moral goodness is th result of inner psychological compulsion, not outer systems of reward and punishment, and that no systems of reward and punishment systems were ever necessary. All of that is clearly false.
and the only way you can do that is by doing something morally good.
Unless there are non-moral gods, which there clearly are,since there are immoral and amoral acts committed to obtain them.
“From which it follows that nobody ever fails to do what is morally good”
No, it does not, unless you assume that people are never mistaken about what would be good to do. I already said that people are sometimes mistaken about this, and think that it would be good to do something, when it would be bad to do it. In those cases they fail to do what is morally good.
I agree there are non-moral goods, e.g. things like pleasure and money and so on. That is because a moral good is “doing something good”, and pleasure and money are not doing anything. But people who commit immoral acts in order to obtain those goods, also believe that they are doing something good, but they are mistaken.
I still don’t think you have made a good case for morality being hypothetical, since you haven’t made a case against the case against. And I still think you need to explain obligatoriness.
Survival is good, you say. If I am in a position to ensure my survival by sacrificing Smith, is it morally good to do so? After all Smith’s survival is just as Good as mine.
Doens’t-care is made to care. If you don’t behave as though you care about morality, society will punish you. However. it won’t punish you for failing to fulfil other shoulds.
I didn’t see any good case against morality being hypothetical, not even in that article.
I did explain obligatoriness. It is obligatory to do something morally good because we don’t have a choice about wanting to do something good. Everyone wants to do that, and the only way you can do that is by doing something morally good.
I did said I do not care about morally-should “as opposed” to what I should do. It could sometimes happen that I should not do something because people will punish me if I do it. In other words, I do care about what I should do, and that is determined by what would be good to do.
From which it follows that nobody ever fails to do what is morally good, and that their inevitable moral goodness is th result of inner psychological compulsion, not outer systems of reward and punishment, and that no systems of reward and punishment systems were ever necessary. All of that is clearly false.
Unless there are non-moral gods, which there clearly are,since there are immoral and amoral acts committed to obtain them.
“From which it follows that nobody ever fails to do what is morally good”
No, it does not, unless you assume that people are never mistaken about what would be good to do. I already said that people are sometimes mistaken about this, and think that it would be good to do something, when it would be bad to do it. In those cases they fail to do what is morally good.
I agree there are non-moral goods, e.g. things like pleasure and money and so on. That is because a moral good is “doing something good”, and pleasure and money are not doing anything. But people who commit immoral acts in order to obtain those goods, also believe that they are doing something good, but they are mistaken.