How many people? How much of this is based on confusion and not actually confronting the scale of suffering involved? (Note that CEV is supposed to account for this, giving us not what we say we want, but what we would want if we were smarter and knew more.)
CEV proponents can always avoid an unpalatable objection to CEV by saying that, “if we knew more and were smarter”, we wouldn’t act in such objectionable ways. But a reason has to be provided for thinking that greater intelligence or better knowledge would in fact cause us to act differently. In these discussions, I see a lot of handwaving, but not many actual reasons.
CEV proponents can always avoid an unpalatable objection to CEV by saying that, “if we knew more and were smarter”, we wouldn’t act in such objectionable ways.
Yeah, it works well against naive objections that some humans behave badly and they have influence on the CEV.
But a reason has to be provided for thinking that greater intelligence or better knowledge would in fact cause us to act differently.
Note that I referred to “if we knew more and were smarter” after asking if proponents of preserving wild animal suffering have actually confronted the scale of suffering involved.
Thanks, JGWeissman. There are certainly some deep ecologists, like presumably Hettinger himself, who have thought long and hard about the scale of wild-animal suffering and still support preservation of ecology as is. When I talk with ecologists or environmentalists, almost always their reply is something like, “Yes, there’s a lot of suffering, but it’s okay because it’s natural for them.” One example:
As I sit here, thinking about the landscape of fear, I watch a small bird at my bird feeder. It spends more time looking around than it does eating. I try to imagine the world from its point of view — the startles, the alarms, the rustle of wings, the paw of the cat. And although I wish it well, I wouldn’t like its predators to disappear.
You can see many more examples here.
A growing number of people have been convinced that wild-animal suffering should be reduced where feasible, but I think this is still a minority view. If more people thought about it harder, probably there would be more support, but ecological preservation is also a very strong intuition for some people. It’s easy not to realize this when we’re in our own bubbles of utilitarian-minded rationalists. :)
Spreading life far and wide is less widespread as a value, but it’s popular enough that the Panspermia Society is one of a few groups that feels this way. I also have a very smart friend who happens to share this goal, even though he acknowledges this would create a lot of suffering.
As far as insects, it’s not obvious that post-humans would care enough to undertake the approximation of their brains that you mention, because maybe it would make the simulation more complicated (=> expensive) or reduce its fidelity. There’s an analogy with factory farming today: Sure, we could prevent animal suffering, but it’s more costly. Still, yes, we can hope that post-humans would give enough weight to insect suffering to avoid this. And I agree insects may very well not be sentient, though if they are, the numbers of suffering minds would be astronomical.
The work on nonperson predicates and computational hazards is great—I’m glad you guys are doing that!
When I talk with ecologists or environmentalists, almost always their reply is something like, “Yes, there’s a lot of suffering, but it’s okay because it’s natural for them.” One example:
As I sit here, thinking about the landscape of fear, I watch a small bird at my bird feeder. It spends more time looking around than it does eating. I try to imagine the world from its point of view — the startles, the alarms, the rustle of wings, the paw of the cat. And although I wish it well, I wouldn’t like its predators to disappear.
The argument seems to be less that the suffering is OK because it is natural than any intervention we can make to remove it would cause nature to not work, as in removing predator species results in more herbivores, which leads to vegetation being over consumed, which leads to ecological collapse. I am sympathetic to this argument. On a large enough scale, this means no breathable atmosphere. So while I think that wild animal suffering is a bad thing, I will accept it for now as a cost of supporting human life. (Maybe you could remove all animals not actually symbiotic with plants, but this seems like a hell of a gamble, we would likely regret the unintended consequences, and it could be difficult to undo.) Once humanity can upload and live in simulations, we have more options. Do you think the typical person advocating ecological balance has evaluated how the tradeoffs would change given future technology?
If more people thought about it harder, probably there would be more support, but ecological preservation is also a very strong intuition for some people. It’s easy not to realize this when we’re in our own bubbles of utilitarian-minded rationalists. :)
CEV is supposed to figure out what people would want if they were more rational. If rationalists tend to discard that intuition, it is not likely to have a strong effect on CEV. (Though if people without such strong intuitions are likely to become more rational, this would not be strong evidence. It may be useful to try raising the sanity waterline among people who demonstrate the intuition and see what happens.)
As far as insects, it’s not obvious that post-humans would care enough to undertake the approximation of their brains that you mention, because maybe it would make the simulation more complicated (=> expensive) or reduce its fidelity.
I am completely against giving up the awesomeness of a good singularity because it is not obvious that the resulting society won’t devote some tiny fraction of their computing power to simulations in which animals happen to suffer. The suffering is bad, but there are other values to consider here, that the scenario includes in far greater quantities.
Do you think the typical person advocating ecological balance has evaluated how the tradeoffs would change given future technology?
Good point. Probably not, and for some, their views would change with new technological options. For others (environmentalist types especially), they would probably retain their old views.
That said, the future-technology sword cuts both ways: Because most people aren’t considering post-human tech, they’re not thinking of (what some see as) the potential astronomical benefits from human survival. If 10^10 humans were only going to live at most another 1-2 billion years on Earth, their happiness could never outweigh the suffering of the 10^18 insects living on Earth at the same time. So if people aren’t thinking about space colonization, why do they care so much about preserving humanity anyway? Two possible reasons are because they’re speciesist and care more about humans or because they value things other than happiness and suffering. I think both are true here, and both are potentially problematic for CEV values.
Though if people without such strong intuitions are likely to become more rational, this would not be strong evidence.
Yeah, that would be my concern. These days, “being rational” tends to select for people who have other characteristics, including being more utilitarian in inclination. Interesting idea about seeing how deep ecologists’ views would change upon becoming more rational.
The suffering is bad, but there are other values to consider here, that the scenario includes in far greater quantities.
We have different intuitions about how bad suffering is. My pain:pleasure exchange rate is higher than that of most people, and this means I think the expected suffering that would result from a Singularity isn’t worth the potential for lots of happiness.
CEV proponents can always avoid an unpalatable objection to CEV by saying that, “if we knew more and were smarter”, we wouldn’t act in such objectionable ways. But a reason has to be provided for thinking that greater intelligence or better knowledge would in fact cause us to act differently. In these discussions, I see a lot of handwaving, but not many actual reasons.
Yeah, it works well against naive objections that some humans behave badly and they have influence on the CEV.
Note that I referred to “if we knew more and were smarter” after asking if proponents of preserving wild animal suffering have actually confronted the scale of suffering involved.
Thanks, JGWeissman. There are certainly some deep ecologists, like presumably Hettinger himself, who have thought long and hard about the scale of wild-animal suffering and still support preservation of ecology as is. When I talk with ecologists or environmentalists, almost always their reply is something like, “Yes, there’s a lot of suffering, but it’s okay because it’s natural for them.” One example:
You can see many more examples here. A growing number of people have been convinced that wild-animal suffering should be reduced where feasible, but I think this is still a minority view. If more people thought about it harder, probably there would be more support, but ecological preservation is also a very strong intuition for some people. It’s easy not to realize this when we’re in our own bubbles of utilitarian-minded rationalists. :)
Spreading life far and wide is less widespread as a value, but it’s popular enough that the Panspermia Society is one of a few groups that feels this way. I also have a very smart friend who happens to share this goal, even though he acknowledges this would create a lot of suffering.
As far as insects, it’s not obvious that post-humans would care enough to undertake the approximation of their brains that you mention, because maybe it would make the simulation more complicated (=> expensive) or reduce its fidelity. There’s an analogy with factory farming today: Sure, we could prevent animal suffering, but it’s more costly. Still, yes, we can hope that post-humans would give enough weight to insect suffering to avoid this. And I agree insects may very well not be sentient, though if they are, the numbers of suffering minds would be astronomical.
The work on nonperson predicates and computational hazards is great—I’m glad you guys are doing that!
The argument seems to be less that the suffering is OK because it is natural than any intervention we can make to remove it would cause nature to not work, as in removing predator species results in more herbivores, which leads to vegetation being over consumed, which leads to ecological collapse. I am sympathetic to this argument. On a large enough scale, this means no breathable atmosphere. So while I think that wild animal suffering is a bad thing, I will accept it for now as a cost of supporting human life. (Maybe you could remove all animals not actually symbiotic with plants, but this seems like a hell of a gamble, we would likely regret the unintended consequences, and it could be difficult to undo.) Once humanity can upload and live in simulations, we have more options. Do you think the typical person advocating ecological balance has evaluated how the tradeoffs would change given future technology?
CEV is supposed to figure out what people would want if they were more rational. If rationalists tend to discard that intuition, it is not likely to have a strong effect on CEV. (Though if people without such strong intuitions are likely to become more rational, this would not be strong evidence. It may be useful to try raising the sanity waterline among people who demonstrate the intuition and see what happens.)
I am completely against giving up the awesomeness of a good singularity because it is not obvious that the resulting society won’t devote some tiny fraction of their computing power to simulations in which animals happen to suffer. The suffering is bad, but there are other values to consider here, that the scenario includes in far greater quantities.
Good point. Probably not, and for some, their views would change with new technological options. For others (environmentalist types especially), they would probably retain their old views.
That said, the future-technology sword cuts both ways: Because most people aren’t considering post-human tech, they’re not thinking of (what some see as) the potential astronomical benefits from human survival. If 10^10 humans were only going to live at most another 1-2 billion years on Earth, their happiness could never outweigh the suffering of the 10^18 insects living on Earth at the same time. So if people aren’t thinking about space colonization, why do they care so much about preserving humanity anyway? Two possible reasons are because they’re speciesist and care more about humans or because they value things other than happiness and suffering. I think both are true here, and both are potentially problematic for CEV values.
Yeah, that would be my concern. These days, “being rational” tends to select for people who have other characteristics, including being more utilitarian in inclination. Interesting idea about seeing how deep ecologists’ views would change upon becoming more rational.
We have different intuitions about how bad suffering is. My pain:pleasure exchange rate is higher than that of most people, and this means I think the expected suffering that would result from a Singularity isn’t worth the potential for lots of happiness.