I think your response is too general. How does the problem of induction being an deductive argument make the conclusion any less absurd? It’s a deductive argument that takes as its premise my ability to imagine something being otherwise. That makes sense if you’re an Empiricist philosopher, since you accept an Empiricist psychology a priori, but not a lot of sense if you’re a scientist or committed to naturalism. Further, the difference you cite between deductive and inductive arguments (that the former is certain and the latter not), is the conclusion of the problem of induction; you can’t use it to argue for the problem of induction.
Paul Gowder,
I think your response is too general. How does the problem of induction being an deductive argument make the conclusion any less absurd? It’s a deductive argument that takes as its premise my ability to imagine something being otherwise. That makes sense if you’re an Empiricist philosopher, since you accept an Empiricist psychology a priori, but not a lot of sense if you’re a scientist or committed to naturalism. Further, the difference you cite between deductive and inductive arguments (that the former is certain and the latter not), is the conclusion of the problem of induction; you can’t use it to argue for the problem of induction.