Ian, your argument fails not merely because premise 1 isn’t established apodictically. (Which is the flaw of inductive reasoning generally, but which, as Eliezer tries to point out to the religious, doesn’t mean we don’t have good reason to believe it.)
It also fails because we have counterexamples up the wazoo. Michael’s point about sentient creatures is one of them. But we can generate a lot of others just by diddling around the space in which we define “objects.” Balls bounce and roll, bowling balls just roll, spherical objects generally do all sorts of crazy things. So the “spherical things” case is a counterexample too, just so far as you define the class of objects in such a way that spherical things count as objects.
You get a one-to-one mapping of object to function only by defining the objects on the functions, by picking as your object a uni-function (or few-function) idea like “ball.” So your argument is actually circular in a sense.
Ian, your argument fails not merely because premise 1 isn’t established apodictically. (Which is the flaw of inductive reasoning generally, but which, as Eliezer tries to point out to the religious, doesn’t mean we don’t have good reason to believe it.)
It also fails because we have counterexamples up the wazoo. Michael’s point about sentient creatures is one of them. But we can generate a lot of others just by diddling around the space in which we define “objects.” Balls bounce and roll, bowling balls just roll, spherical objects generally do all sorts of crazy things. So the “spherical things” case is a counterexample too, just so far as you define the class of objects in such a way that spherical things count as objects.
You get a one-to-one mapping of object to function only by defining the objects on the functions, by picking as your object a uni-function (or few-function) idea like “ball.” So your argument is actually circular in a sense.