Don’t you think there is a risk that attaching relevance to rudeness in this way provides an easy excuse for dismissing comments that might be worth taking seriously? Especially when the comments in question challenge established social practices that many people are unwilling to change and who as such are naturally predisposed to see rudeness even in comments that are not actually rude or weren’t intended to be.
Don’t you think there is a risk that attaching relevance to rudeness in this way provides an easy excuse for dismissing comments that might be worth taking seriously?
Of course I do. But I think that risk is made minimal by requiring several factors- rudeness is strike 1, and making it up to strike 3 to get called out requires two other infractions. That means that some arguments will be out that wouldn’t be if we didn’t measure rudeness, but the marginal comments are two-strike arguments that are rude; we’re looking at pretty low value, here.
weren’t intended to be.
This is actually the strongest argument for downvoting things for being rude- instead of letting people continue to unknowingly behaving in a way that reflects poorly on them, you make it explicit to them that their behavior is winning them no friends. They have an opportunity to practice losing gracefully, rewrite their argument to be superior, and clear up their thinking with regards to the issue.
instead of letting people continue to unknowingly behaving in a way that reflects poorly on them
I think this whole discussion about rudeness keeps oscillating between the claim that rude behavior is socially inappropriate and that such behavior is objectionable from the point of view of truth-seeking. The quote above is a case in point: you say that the “strongest argument” for downvoting rude comments is that it “reflects poorly on” commenters. But rudeness reflects poorly on someone socially and not (except in an indirect sort of way) epistemically. I see no reason for thinking that a community of people devoted to refining the art of human rationality should assume the task of punishing others for saying things that would reflect poorly on them as social creatures.
I also note (again) that there is sometimes a tension between doing what is socially appropriate and what is epistemically appropriate. Thus, there is a social norm against questioning people’s motives in the context of a debate or discussion; but quite often there is sufficient evidence that such motives are questionable, and in many of these cases questioning these motives is what concern for truth would require. I think a community of truth-seekers should make a special effort to keep these two different sense of propriety apart, in order to prevent social norms from interfering with the quest for truth. After all, such norms were selected for their tendency to promote social harmony rather than human knowledge.
The quote above is a case in point: you say that the “strongest argument” for downvoting rude comments is that it “reflects poorly on” commenters.
I apologize if I was unclear: upvotes and downvotes exist to signal to two different groups: the authors of comments, and the readers of comments. To the first group they have pedagogical value (“ok, I should be posting X and should refrain from posting Y”) and to the second group they have predictive value (“hmm, karma too low? I don’t think I’ll waste my time”).
And so my argument is that if someone posts statement Z and doesn’t realize that statement Z is rude, then a downvote (preferably coupled with a polite “try being less rude” comment) is the best thing for them pedagogically, since it helps them improve their ability to articulate themself. If they know they’re being rude but think it helps make their point, that’s one thing- but if it’s from ignorance, even ignorance of social customs, then that’s something we generally try to fix around here.
And, in case you’re wondering, this is the sort of thing that happens to everyone. If one of EY’s comments approaches the issue the wrong way, it will get voted down.
I see no reason for thinking that a community of people devoted to refining the art of human rationality should assume the task of punishing others for saying things that would reflect poorly on them as social creatures.
Rational agents should WIN. Winning often involves social interaction (especially if your goal is to persuade others).
I also note (again) that there is sometimes a tension between doing what is socially appropriate and what is epistemically appropriate.
This looks like a false dilemma. It’s not “do I point out their hypocrisy or not?”- there are two separate questions, “do I raise this issue?” and “how do I raise it?”. You seem to be under the impression that the only way to raise this issue is rudely, and it’s better to be rude than not raise the issue. I strongly disagree; there are very many ways you could approach the issue with a little patience and get much farther than you did. For example, you could say something like “I’m curious about your justification for eating meat; would you mind telling me it?” or “Is vegetarianism an issue that’s come up here before? There seems to be a lot about moral reasoning and that seems as appropriate a question as any.”
Tact is a rather valuable skill, both at convincing others of their errors and leaving yourself in a social position where you can admit your errors. Both are valuable tools when it comes to refining human rationality.
Don’t you think there is a risk that attaching relevance to rudeness in this way provides an easy excuse for dismissing comments that might be worth taking seriously? Especially when the comments in question challenge established social practices that many people are unwilling to change and who as such are naturally predisposed to see rudeness even in comments that are not actually rude or weren’t intended to be.
Of course I do. But I think that risk is made minimal by requiring several factors- rudeness is strike 1, and making it up to strike 3 to get called out requires two other infractions. That means that some arguments will be out that wouldn’t be if we didn’t measure rudeness, but the marginal comments are two-strike arguments that are rude; we’re looking at pretty low value, here.
This is actually the strongest argument for downvoting things for being rude- instead of letting people continue to unknowingly behaving in a way that reflects poorly on them, you make it explicit to them that their behavior is winning them no friends. They have an opportunity to practice losing gracefully, rewrite their argument to be superior, and clear up their thinking with regards to the issue.
I think this whole discussion about rudeness keeps oscillating between the claim that rude behavior is socially inappropriate and that such behavior is objectionable from the point of view of truth-seeking. The quote above is a case in point: you say that the “strongest argument” for downvoting rude comments is that it “reflects poorly on” commenters. But rudeness reflects poorly on someone socially and not (except in an indirect sort of way) epistemically. I see no reason for thinking that a community of people devoted to refining the art of human rationality should assume the task of punishing others for saying things that would reflect poorly on them as social creatures.
I also note (again) that there is sometimes a tension between doing what is socially appropriate and what is epistemically appropriate. Thus, there is a social norm against questioning people’s motives in the context of a debate or discussion; but quite often there is sufficient evidence that such motives are questionable, and in many of these cases questioning these motives is what concern for truth would require. I think a community of truth-seekers should make a special effort to keep these two different sense of propriety apart, in order to prevent social norms from interfering with the quest for truth. After all, such norms were selected for their tendency to promote social harmony rather than human knowledge.
I apologize if I was unclear: upvotes and downvotes exist to signal to two different groups: the authors of comments, and the readers of comments. To the first group they have pedagogical value (“ok, I should be posting X and should refrain from posting Y”) and to the second group they have predictive value (“hmm, karma too low? I don’t think I’ll waste my time”).
And so my argument is that if someone posts statement Z and doesn’t realize that statement Z is rude, then a downvote (preferably coupled with a polite “try being less rude” comment) is the best thing for them pedagogically, since it helps them improve their ability to articulate themself. If they know they’re being rude but think it helps make their point, that’s one thing- but if it’s from ignorance, even ignorance of social customs, then that’s something we generally try to fix around here.
And, in case you’re wondering, this is the sort of thing that happens to everyone. If one of EY’s comments approaches the issue the wrong way, it will get voted down.
Rational agents should WIN. Winning often involves social interaction (especially if your goal is to persuade others).
This looks like a false dilemma. It’s not “do I point out their hypocrisy or not?”- there are two separate questions, “do I raise this issue?” and “how do I raise it?”. You seem to be under the impression that the only way to raise this issue is rudely, and it’s better to be rude than not raise the issue. I strongly disagree; there are very many ways you could approach the issue with a little patience and get much farther than you did. For example, you could say something like “I’m curious about your justification for eating meat; would you mind telling me it?” or “Is vegetarianism an issue that’s come up here before? There seems to be a lot about moral reasoning and that seems as appropriate a question as any.”
Tact is a rather valuable skill, both at convincing others of their errors and leaving yourself in a social position where you can admit your errors. Both are valuable tools when it comes to refining human rationality.