I don’t believe what’s going on here is the sort of thing that should be called a ‘fallacy’. Maybe it’s a bias? A fallacy involves reaching a conclusion through invalid reasoning—whether we’re dealing with a formal or informal fallacy, it’s demonstrated by the possibility of true premises and a false conclusion.
Consider the following examples:
(A)
p→q
q→r
r→s
s→t
∴ p→t
In this example 1-4 are premises, and this is a valid argument in sentential logic. However, depending on the understanding of the reader and the available rules of inference/replacement, it may be missing some steps. The conclusion comes from invoking the hypothetical syllogism 3 times successively, and the reader might not accept the hypothetical syllogism in the first place. However, in no case can premises 1-4 be true and the conclusion (5) be false.
(B)
p→q
¬p
∴ ¬q
This is an example of a formal fallacy; 1 and 2 are premises. It could be the case that q is true and p is false, which would render the premises true and conclusion false.
(C)
S has argued that p
S is a bad person
∴ ¬p
This is an example of an informal fallacy; 1 and 2 are premises. It could be the case that p is true, regardless of S’s character. These fallacies can often be resolved by adding an additional premise, which makes the argument valid but shows that it is unsound. For example:
(D)
S has argued that p
S is a bad person.
if S is a bad person and S has argued that p, then ¬p
∴ ¬p
Here, 1-3 are premises. This might not be very helpful to its case, but now the argument commits no fallacy; it simply asserts (3) which is a false premise, so this argument is valid but unsound.
Now which of these does the ‘catchy fallacy name fallacy’ resemble? It seems to me that our two options are (A), where no fallacy is committed but the reader may need more explanation, and (C), where we’re asserting that the arguer is leaving out a contentious premise.
I assert that most occasions of this phenomenon are more like (A) than (C), and so this should not be called a fallacy.
Would you rather call it the “Catchy Bias Name Bias”, or maybe the “Catchy Cognitive Error Name Cognitive Error”? Whatever. The name was just a silly hook. The concept that you should support your counterarguments in a way that actually ties it to the argument you mean to refute is the central point I wanted to make. Call it, and the failure to do so, whatever you like.
There’s room for some confusion as to who commits the fallacy. If the speaker correctly classifies a mistake (that really is a mistake) as part of a category of structurally related mistakes, that’s hardly a fallacy. The fallacy is, as you point out, taking a nice sounding label itself as evidence. Using quotes from famous people creates a similar danger.
I think there is a name for this effect, “association” or “framing” or something. But whatever.
I think we should be more careful about separating heuristics and biases. Heuristics are biased compared to perfect thought, but that’s a pointless comparison. You can accuse someone of overusing a heuristic beyond optimal use, but that’s a lot weaker than saying it would be better not to use it. Calling things fallacies implies that they’re not worth using at all, which is often wrong. Arguments never take the simple deductive form you portray. Ad hominem is a legitimate heuristic and calling it a fallacy is a mistake. But everyone does it, so “fallacy” is a pretty weak word.
I don’t see much difference between (A) and (C). Translation between formal and informal usually is contentious.
Ad hominems are not always fallacious, but the ad hominem fallacy is. The character, circumstances, or actions of the arguer have no bearing on whether the argument’s conclusion follows from its premises.
The character of the speaker could be a good reason to question the truth-value of the speaker’s claims. And given limited time/resources, it might be a good enough reason to not bother to listen to the speaker’s argument. But it is never what makes an argument invalid, regardless of whether one is reasoning deductively. If you disagree, please give a counterexample.
ETA: it’s also never what makes it the case that p is false, unless the speaker’s character is directly linked to the proposition somehow. (like in the proposition, “I am a good person”)
I don’t believe what’s going on here is the sort of thing that should be called a ‘fallacy’. Maybe it’s a bias? A fallacy involves reaching a conclusion through invalid reasoning—whether we’re dealing with a formal or informal fallacy, it’s demonstrated by the possibility of true premises and a false conclusion.
Consider the following examples:
(A)
p→q
q→r
r→s
s→t
∴ p→t
In this example 1-4 are premises, and this is a valid argument in sentential logic. However, depending on the understanding of the reader and the available rules of inference/replacement, it may be missing some steps. The conclusion comes from invoking the hypothetical syllogism 3 times successively, and the reader might not accept the hypothetical syllogism in the first place. However, in no case can premises 1-4 be true and the conclusion (5) be false.
(B)
p→q
¬p
∴ ¬q
This is an example of a formal fallacy; 1 and 2 are premises. It could be the case that q is true and p is false, which would render the premises true and conclusion false.
(C)
S has argued that p
S is a bad person
∴ ¬p
This is an example of an informal fallacy; 1 and 2 are premises. It could be the case that p is true, regardless of S’s character. These fallacies can often be resolved by adding an additional premise, which makes the argument valid but shows that it is unsound. For example:
(D)
S has argued that p
S is a bad person.
if S is a bad person and S has argued that p, then ¬p
∴ ¬p
Here, 1-3 are premises. This might not be very helpful to its case, but now the argument commits no fallacy; it simply asserts (3) which is a false premise, so this argument is valid but unsound.
Now which of these does the ‘catchy fallacy name fallacy’ resemble? It seems to me that our two options are (A), where no fallacy is committed but the reader may need more explanation, and (C), where we’re asserting that the arguer is leaving out a contentious premise.
I assert that most occasions of this phenomenon are more like (A) than (C), and so this should not be called a fallacy.
Would you rather call it the “Catchy Bias Name Bias”, or maybe the “Catchy Cognitive Error Name Cognitive Error”? Whatever. The name was just a silly hook. The concept that you should support your counterarguments in a way that actually ties it to the argument you mean to refute is the central point I wanted to make. Call it, and the failure to do so, whatever you like.
The catchy name of the catchy fallacy name fallacy.
There’s room for some confusion as to who commits the fallacy. If the speaker correctly classifies a mistake (that really is a mistake) as part of a category of structurally related mistakes, that’s hardly a fallacy. The fallacy is, as you point out, taking a nice sounding label itself as evidence. Using quotes from famous people creates a similar danger.
I think there is a name for this effect, “association” or “framing” or something. But whatever.
I think we should be more careful about separating heuristics and biases. Heuristics are biased compared to perfect thought, but that’s a pointless comparison. You can accuse someone of overusing a heuristic beyond optimal use, but that’s a lot weaker than saying it would be better not to use it. Calling things fallacies implies that they’re not worth using at all, which is often wrong. Arguments never take the simple deductive form you portray. Ad hominem is a legitimate heuristic and calling it a fallacy is a mistake. But everyone does it, so “fallacy” is a pretty weak word.
I don’t see much difference between (A) and (C). Translation between formal and informal usually is contentious.
Ad hominems are not always fallacious, but the ad hominem fallacy is. The character, circumstances, or actions of the arguer have no bearing on whether the argument’s conclusion follows from its premises.
The character of the speaker could be a good reason to question the truth-value of the speaker’s claims. And given limited time/resources, it might be a good enough reason to not bother to listen to the speaker’s argument. But it is never what makes an argument invalid, regardless of whether one is reasoning deductively. If you disagree, please give a counterexample.
ETA: it’s also never what makes it the case that p is false, unless the speaker’s character is directly linked to the proposition somehow. (like in the proposition, “I am a good person”)