Consider the subset of all possible human minds that would rather exist than not exist. Each are, tautologically I think, better off existing.
Yes, there are possible minds that would rather exist than not exist. However, those minds don’t exist, so why should I factor them into my utility function? I’m not doing ‘them’ a disservice, since there is no ‘them’ that I’m doing a disservice to.
It seems to me equivalent to Anselm’s ontological argument, where we say that since god is by definition the greatest, and it’s greater to exist than to not exist, then god must exist. The counterargument is that god, not existing, has no properties. Attempting to take into account the properties of nonexistent or hypothetical entities leads us to all sorts of weird conclusions.
Yes, there are possible minds that would rather exist than not exist. However, those minds don’t exist, so why should I factor them into my utility function? I’m not doing ‘them’ a disservice, since there is no ‘them’ that I’m doing a disservice to.
It seems to me equivalent to Anselm’s ontological argument, where we say that since god is by definition the greatest, and it’s greater to exist than to not exist, then god must exist. The counterargument is that god, not existing, has no properties. Attempting to take into account the properties of nonexistent or hypothetical entities leads us to all sorts of weird conclusions.