What for? It doesn’t help me achieve good things to know whether you are morally good, except to the extent that “you are morally good” makes useful predictions about your behaviour that I can use to achieve more good. And that’s a question for epistemology, not morality.
Because then you apportion reward and punishment where they are deserved. That is itself a Good, called “justice”
“what should A do”, which is the only question A is interested in.
I don’t see how that follows from consequentialism or anything else.
So another way of looking at it is that for this sort of consequentialist, morality is purely personal.
Because then you apportion reward and punishment where they are deserved. That is itself a Good, called “justice”
I get it now. I think I ought to hold myself to a higher standard than I hold other people, because it would be ridiculous to judge everyone in the world for failing to try as hard as they can to improve it, and ridiculous to let myself off with anything less than that full effort. And I take it you don’t see things this way.
I don’t see how that follows from consequentialism or anything else.
It follows from the practical concern that A only gets to control the actions of A, so any question not in some way useful for determining A’s actions isn’t interesting to A.
. I think I ought to hold myself to a higher standard than I hold other people, because it would be ridiculous to judge everyone in the world for failing to try as hard as they can to improve it, and ridiculous to let myself off with anything less than that full effort.
It doesn’t follow from that that you have no interest in praise and blame.
It follows from the practical concern that A only gets to control the actions of A, so any question not in some way useful for determining A’s actions isn’t interesting to A.
Isn’t A interested in the actions of B and C that impinge on A?
Isn’t A interested in the actions of B and C that impinge on A?
A is interested in:
1) The state of the world. This is important information for deciding anything. 2) A’s possible actions, and their consequences. “Their consequences” == expected future state of the world for each action.
“actions of B and C that impinge on A” is a subset of 1) and “giving praise and blame” is a subset of 2). “Influencing the actions of B and C” is also a subset of 2).
1) The state of the world. This is important information for deciding anything.
2) A’s possible actions, and their consequences. “Their consequences” == expected future state of the world for each action.
It doesn’t follow from that that you have no interest in praise and blame.
Yes, and it doesn’t follow that because I am interested in praise and blame, I must hold other people to the same standard I hold myself. I said right there in the passage you quoted that I do in fact hold other people to some standard, it’s just not the same as I use for myself.
Isn’t A interested in the actions of B and C that impinge on A?
Yes as a matter of epistemology and normative ethics, but not as a matter of metaethics.
Because then you apportion reward and punishment where they are deserved. That is itself a Good, called “justice”
I don’t see how that follows from consequentialism or anything else.
Then it is limited.
I get it now. I think I ought to hold myself to a higher standard than I hold other people, because it would be ridiculous to judge everyone in the world for failing to try as hard as they can to improve it, and ridiculous to let myself off with anything less than that full effort. And I take it you don’t see things this way.
It follows from the practical concern that A only gets to control the actions of A, so any question not in some way useful for determining A’s actions isn’t interesting to A.
It doesn’t follow from that that you have no interest in praise and blame.
Isn’t A interested in the actions of B and C that impinge on A?
A is interested in:
1) The state of the world. This is important information for deciding anything.
2) A’s possible actions, and their consequences. “Their consequences” == expected future state of the world for each action.
“actions of B and C that impinge on A” is a subset of 1) and “giving praise and blame” is a subset of 2). “Influencing the actions of B and C” is also a subset of 2).
1) The state of the world. This is important information for deciding anything. 2) A’s possible actions, and their consequences. “Their consequences” == expected future state of the world for each action.
Or, briefly “The Union of A and not-A”
or, more briefly still:
“Everything”.
Yes, and it doesn’t follow that because I am interested in praise and blame, I must hold other people to the same standard I hold myself. I said right there in the passage you quoted that I do in fact hold other people to some standard, it’s just not the same as I use for myself.
Yes as a matter of epistemology and normative ethics, but not as a matter of metaethics.
Your metaethics treats everyone as acting but not acted on?