I don’t see what you’re getting at. I’ll lay out my full position to see if that helps.
First of all, there are seperate concepts for metaethics and normative ethics. They are a meta-level apart, and mixing them up is like telling me that 2+2=4 when I’m asking about whether 4 is an integer.
So, given those rigidly seperated mental buckets, I claim as a matter of metaethics, that moral theories solve the problem of what ought to be done. Then, as a practical concern, the only question interesting to me, is “what should I do?”, because it’s the only one I can act on. I don’t think this makes me an egoist, or in fact is any evidence at all about what I think ought to be done, because what ought to be done is a question for moral theories, not metaethics.
Then, on the level of normative ethics, i.e. looking from within a moral theory, (which I’ve decided answers the question “what ought to be done”), I claim that I ought to act in such a way as achieves the “best” outcome, and if outcomes are morally identical, then the oughtness of them is identitcal, and I don’t care which is done. You can call this “consequentialism” if you like. Then, unpacking “best” a bit, we find all the good things like fun, happiness, freedom, life, etc.
Among the good things, we may or may not find punishing the unjust and rewarding the just. i suspect we do find it. I claim that this punishableness is not the same as the rightness that the actions of moral agents have, because it includes things like “he didn’t know any better” and “can we really expect people to...”, which I claim are not included in what makes an action right or wrong. This terminal punishableness thing is also mixed up with the instrumental concerns of incentives and game theory, which I claim are a seperate problem to be solved once you’ve worked out what is terminally valueable.
So, anyways, this is all a long widned way of saying that when deciding what to do, I hold myself to a much more demanding standard than I use when judging the actions of others.
What’s wrong with sticking with “what ought to be done” as formulation?
I claim that I ought to act in such a way as achieves the “best” outcome,
Meaning others shouldn’t? Your use of the “I” formulation is making your theory unclear.
I claim that this punishableness is not the same as the rightness that the actions of moral agents have, because it includes things like “he didn’t know any better” and “can we really expect people to...”,
They seem different to you because you are a consequentialist. Consequentialist good and bad outcomes can;t be directly transalted in praiseworthiness and blamewoorthiness because they are too hard to predict.
So, anyways, this is all a long widned way of saying that when deciding what to do, I hold myself to a much more demanding standard than I use when judging the actions of others.
I don’t see why. Do you think you are much better at making predictions?
I don’t see what you’re getting at. I’ll lay out my full position to see if that helps.
First of all, there are seperate concepts for metaethics and normative ethics. They are a meta-level apart, and mixing them up is like telling me that 2+2=4 when I’m asking about whether 4 is an integer.
So, given those rigidly seperated mental buckets, I claim as a matter of metaethics, that moral theories solve the problem of what ought to be done. Then, as a practical concern, the only question interesting to me, is “what should I do?”, because it’s the only one I can act on. I don’t think this makes me an egoist, or in fact is any evidence at all about what I think ought to be done, because what ought to be done is a question for moral theories, not metaethics.
Then, on the level of normative ethics, i.e. looking from within a moral theory, (which I’ve decided answers the question “what ought to be done”), I claim that I ought to act in such a way as achieves the “best” outcome, and if outcomes are morally identical, then the oughtness of them is identitcal, and I don’t care which is done. You can call this “consequentialism” if you like. Then, unpacking “best” a bit, we find all the good things like fun, happiness, freedom, life, etc.
Among the good things, we may or may not find punishing the unjust and rewarding the just. i suspect we do find it. I claim that this punishableness is not the same as the rightness that the actions of moral agents have, because it includes things like “he didn’t know any better” and “can we really expect people to...”, which I claim are not included in what makes an action right or wrong. This terminal punishableness thing is also mixed up with the instrumental concerns of incentives and game theory, which I claim are a seperate problem to be solved once you’ve worked out what is terminally valueable.
So, anyways, this is all a long widned way of saying that when deciding what to do, I hold myself to a much more demanding standard than I use when judging the actions of others.
What’s wrong with sticking with “what ought to be done” as formulation?
Meaning others shouldn’t? Your use of the “I” formulation is making your theory unclear.
They seem different to you because you are a consequentialist. Consequentialist good and bad outcomes can;t be directly transalted in praiseworthiness and blamewoorthiness because they are too hard to predict.
I don’t see why. Do you think you are much better at making predictions?