Indeed, for all intents and purposes, you control what he does. Imagine, for example, that you want to get something written on his whiteboard: let’s say, the words “I am the egg man; you are the walrus.” What to do? Just write it on your own whiteboard. Go ahead, try it. It will really work. When you two rendezvous after this is all over, his whiteboard will bear the words you chose. In this sense, your whiteboard is a strange kind of portal; a slate via which you can etch your choices into his far-away world; a chance to act, spookily, at a distance.
I don’t buy that at all. Your counterpart is, by hypothesis, a deterministic machine, so what he does is entirely accounted for by his own local state, without any need for you to be a casual or explanatory factor. For another , you are, by hypothesis, a deterministic machine as well, so you can’t choose to do capricious things that are not in your programming. You can’t use libertarian free will to control your counterpart if you don’t have it ITFP. For a third thing, the situation is symmetrical , in a way that suggests corelation, not causation.
I think it’s a pretty good objection. What does it even mean to say that you can “control” your duplicate if we are postulating that what you and your duplicate do is a deterministic function of your current states? What does it even mean to say that you can control or decide anything under these circumstances?
It means that the relationship that you call (from your subjective perspective) “my controlling what I do” between the Deciding and the Everything Else, is the same as the relationship between the Deciding in you and the Everything Else in your duplicate (as well as D-dup:EE-dup and D-dup:EE-you).
But if control is inherently asymmetric, it can’t be a relationship that is “the same” or symmetric.
That might not be your definition of control. I can explain control in terms of asymmetry and counterfactuals. I haven’t seen an alternative explanation.
By control, I mean that I can control for example where my hand goes. That’s asymmetric between me and my hand, but it’s very similar to the relationship between you and your hand; and it’s even more similar to the relationship between my duplicate and their hand.
Of course you know that sometimes the right way to understand the situation is to say that you control your hand. Right? That’s what we’re talking about here.
Ok. You’re controlling your hand, not vice versa. But what about the relationship between you and your duplicate....who is the controller and who is controlled?
It’s neither causality nor correlation: it’s subjunctive dependence, of which causality is a special case. Since your counterpart is implementing the same decision procedure as you, making decision X in situation Y means your counterpart does X in Y too.
(First, a correction: I said it’s neither causality nor correlation, but it is of course correlation; it’s just stronger than that.)
I’d say yes, but I haven’t thought much about control yet. If I cooperate, so does my twin. If, counterfactually, I defected instead, then my twin would also have defected. I’d see that as control, but it depends on your definition I guess.
I don’t buy that at all. Your counterpart is, by hypothesis, a deterministic machine, so what he does is entirely accounted for by his own local state, without any need for you to be a casual or explanatory factor. For another , you are, by hypothesis, a deterministic machine as well, so you can’t choose to do capricious things that are not in your programming. You can’t use libertarian free will to control your counterpart if you don’t have it ITFP. For a third thing, the situation is symmetrical , in a way that suggests corelation, not causation.
This has been voted down too much.
I think it’s a pretty good objection. What does it even mean to say that you can “control” your duplicate if we are postulating that what you and your duplicate do is a deterministic function of your current states? What does it even mean to say that you can control or decide anything under these circumstances?
It means that the relationship that you call (from your subjective perspective) “my controlling what I do” between the Deciding and the Everything Else, is the same as the relationship between the Deciding in you and the Everything Else in your duplicate (as well as D-dup:EE-dup and D-dup:EE-you).
But if control is inherently asymmetric, it can’t be a relationship that is “the same” or symmetric.
That might not be your definition of control. I can explain control in terms of asymmetry and counterfactuals. I haven’t seen an alternative explanation.
(I don’t understand what you’re saying.)
Edited.
By control, I mean that I can control for example where my hand goes. That’s asymmetric between me and my hand, but it’s very similar to the relationship between you and your hand; and it’s even more similar to the relationship between my duplicate and their hand.
The obvious answer to this is that under these circumstances, you don’t control your hand or anything else either.
Of course you know that sometimes the right way to understand the situation is to say that you control your hand. Right? That’s what we’re talking about here.
Ok. You’re controlling your hand, not vice versa. But what about the relationship between you and your duplicate....who is the controller and who is controlled?
The parts of you and your duplicate that do the controlling, are the same thing.
No , they are exact duplicates but numerically distinct.
It’s neither causality nor correlation: it’s subjunctive dependence, of which causality is a special case. Since your counterpart is implementing the same decision procedure as you, making decision X in situation Y means your counterpart does X in Y too.
So is subjunctive dependence control?
(First, a correction: I said it’s neither causality nor correlation, but it is of course correlation; it’s just stronger than that.)
I’d say yes, but I haven’t thought much about control yet. If I cooperate, so does my twin. If, counterfactually, I defected instead, then my twin would also have defected. I’d see that as control, but it depends on your definition I guess.
You and your twin would be synchronised. It’s literally synchronicity, an acausal connecting principal.
Yes, it’s acausal. No disagreement there!