the idea that during sleep my mind declines enough to merge into other experiences and I awake into a world I would consider alien, with perfectly consistent memories.
An entity with self-consistent memories is astronomically more likely to be found in a world which matches those memories, than in some mismatched world. The latter has a complexity penalty equal to all the extra mismatched complexity.
That depends on the set of worlds and the measure used. For instance, some models predict that almost all minds will be Boltzmann brains that are uncorrelated with their environment beyond a small local bubble. We can’t falsify these models directly; we just have to assume they’re wrong to be able to use the past to predict the future.
Yes, I’m saying that memories aren’t accessed while you sleep. Don’t know to what extent. I always did exist in this world, but I’m also made of many other Eitans from slightly different worlds whose experience of sleeping was identical to mine. I’m just worried about the scale of difference.
An entity with self-consistent memories is astronomically more likely to be found in a world which matches those memories, than in some mismatched world. The latter has a complexity penalty equal to all the extra mismatched complexity.
That depends on the set of worlds and the measure used. For instance, some models predict that almost all minds will be Boltzmann brains that are uncorrelated with their environment beyond a small local bubble. We can’t falsify these models directly; we just have to assume they’re wrong to be able to use the past to predict the future.
Under what assumptions?
Yes, I’m saying that memories aren’t accessed while you sleep. Don’t know to what extent. I always did exist in this world, but I’m also made of many other Eitans from slightly different worlds whose experience of sleeping was identical to mine. I’m just worried about the scale of difference.