The branches wherein you die are effectively discounted, because there is no future you who will remember your current self. The same applies to lesser degree to branches where you suffer brain/memory damage, to varying partial degree.
The problem with the whole QM suicide/immortality is that it assumes that we shouldn’t care about measure, and we shouldn’t care at all about universes that lack ourselves as future observers. Both of these notions are probably wrong from the perspective of normal human utility functions.
The branches wherein you die are effectively discounted, because there is no future you who will remember your current self. The same applies to lesser degree to branches where you suffer brain/memory damage, to varying partial degree.
Well think through an example: imagine the future world where ‘your’ brain contains someone else’s memories and personality tomorrow instead of your own. Compare that to the future world where your body contains someone else’s skin pattern on the right arm ( a similar amount of physical matter/information replacement).
In the first world ‘you’ (the bio software mind I am currently speaking to) ceases to exist, whereas in the second world ‘you’ remains.
Still don’t understand your point/question—what do you mean by “reducing destruction to a binary event”?. Earlier I mentioned that destruction/survival isn’t binary at all.
The idea is that there is always some branches in which a version of yourself survives. Survival is not binary, there are different degrees of ‘survival’.
Yes, there are always some branches. But you can only follow one at a time. If you are in a branch in which your skull is being crushed, you are not likely to jump to a branch where you are totally fine.
There always exists some tiny subset of branches where you survive.
BTW, I don’t completely buy the argument—as I mentioned earlier, measure is important and it works out to normality of probability. If my skull is being crushed, most of the branches past that point don’t contain me. I care about the whole set, so the fact that I always survive in some tiny rare branches is not much of a consolation.
The branches wherein you die are effectively discounted, because there is no future you who will remember your current self. The same applies to lesser degree to branches where you suffer brain/memory damage, to varying partial degree.
The problem with the whole QM suicide/immortality is that it assumes that we shouldn’t care about measure, and we shouldn’t care at all about universes that lack ourselves as future observers. Both of these notions are probably wrong from the perspective of normal human utility functions.
Why? What is so irreducible about my memories?
Well think through an example: imagine the future world where ‘your’ brain contains someone else’s memories and personality tomorrow instead of your own. Compare that to the future world where your body contains someone else’s skin pattern on the right arm ( a similar amount of physical matter/information replacement).
In the first world ‘you’ (the bio software mind I am currently speaking to) ceases to exist, whereas in the second world ‘you’ remains.
I don’t understand. I’m asking about irreducibility.
I don’t understand then—what do you mean by irreducibility of memories?
I mean it is required for quantum immortality. Other than reducing their destruction to an binary event, how can they continue on?
Still don’t understand your point/question—what do you mean by “reducing destruction to a binary event”?. Earlier I mentioned that destruction/survival isn’t binary at all.
The idea is that there is always some branches in which a version of yourself survives. Survival is not binary, there are different degrees of ‘survival’.
Yes, there are always some branches. But you can only follow one at a time. If you are in a branch in which your skull is being crushed, you are not likely to jump to a branch where you are totally fine.
There always exists some tiny subset of branches where you survive.
BTW, I don’t completely buy the argument—as I mentioned earlier, measure is important and it works out to normality of probability. If my skull is being crushed, most of the branches past that point don’t contain me. I care about the whole set, so the fact that I always survive in some tiny rare branches is not much of a consolation.
I’m with Yvain on measure, I just can’t bring myself to care.
Relative measure matters, but its equivalent to probability and thus adds up to normality.