Probability theory does not extend logic (predicate calculus). In particular, freely mixing logical quantifiers (∀, ∃) and probability statements gets messy fairly quickly, and the tools to disambiguate their meaning may not be found solely in probability theory (but perhaps in statistical inference or in the study of causality.)
The original article made it sound like that was an area of unfinished research (at the time it was written). If that’s been solved, I imagine the original writer might want to know about it.
No, this hasn’t been solved. But I imagine that mixing logical quantifiers and probability statements would be less messy if one e.g., knows the causal graph of the events to which the statements refer. This is something that the original post didn’t mention, but which I thought was interesting.
The original article made it sound like that was an area of unfinished research (at the time it was written). If that’s been solved, I imagine the original writer might want to know about it.
No, this hasn’t been solved. But I imagine that mixing logical quantifiers and probability statements would be less messy if one e.g., knows the causal graph of the events to which the statements refer. This is something that the original post didn’t mention, but which I thought was interesting.