I would like an explicitation for the reasons why it seems to be false. In particular I fail to see how computational account would be against it. You can compute with levers, transistors and a large array of different things. And actually there is no things you can’t compute with. Thus you can compute with anything. So anything is “computy” which is another way of saying it’s “mindy”. But ofcourse that everything can be used in computing doesn’t mean the computations are of equal value/complexity. Thus a genuine difference between rocks and people. But that it still allows that there is “what it feels to be a rock inside”. Granted it probably isn’t anything grand or interesting. However it would be really weird if there was a clear division where “feeling” began and “cold” motion stopped.
I would like to note that an abstraction where we disregard “feelings” and focus on technical public impact with the environment can lead to a “cold” conceptation of the world. However when used as a worldview (that is outside of tracking positions and mechanics) it is quite erroneus. In an extreme extrapolation you are just a robot and should be “cold”. This kind of non-psychisim has the loudest counterevidence there is available—you do feel (crossing fingers that you are not a zombie). Whether the psychisims extends beyond you is an open question. If you can get around the problem of other minds that is existence of psychisims like you why would you assume that there are only feelers like you? Ie there is an analog problem of mindness of other, given that you could not directly experience the feelings of rocks why would you assume they don’t have them?
If the answer is purely because you are used to abstract that facet of them away because of practical needs that doesn’t answer the theorethical question. It is the same that a psychopath would treat fully fledged people—to him it doesn’t matter what people are on the inside only what he can do with them. In that way the “cold” and “feely” way of relating to your surroundings don’t disagree what the mechanics are. But why insist that the “feely” way is false or inferior?
Is it?
(but what jimrandomh says is still correct)
I would like an explicitation for the reasons why it seems to be false. In particular I fail to see how computational account would be against it. You can compute with levers, transistors and a large array of different things. And actually there is no things you can’t compute with. Thus you can compute with anything. So anything is “computy” which is another way of saying it’s “mindy”. But ofcourse that everything can be used in computing doesn’t mean the computations are of equal value/complexity. Thus a genuine difference between rocks and people. But that it still allows that there is “what it feels to be a rock inside”. Granted it probably isn’t anything grand or interesting. However it would be really weird if there was a clear division where “feeling” began and “cold” motion stopped.
I would like to note that an abstraction where we disregard “feelings” and focus on technical public impact with the environment can lead to a “cold” conceptation of the world. However when used as a worldview (that is outside of tracking positions and mechanics) it is quite erroneus. In an extreme extrapolation you are just a robot and should be “cold”. This kind of non-psychisim has the loudest counterevidence there is available—you do feel (crossing fingers that you are not a zombie). Whether the psychisims extends beyond you is an open question. If you can get around the problem of other minds that is existence of psychisims like you why would you assume that there are only feelers like you? Ie there is an analog problem of mindness of other, given that you could not directly experience the feelings of rocks why would you assume they don’t have them?
If the answer is purely because you are used to abstract that facet of them away because of practical needs that doesn’t answer the theorethical question. It is the same that a psychopath would treat fully fledged people—to him it doesn’t matter what people are on the inside only what he can do with them. In that way the “cold” and “feely” way of relating to your surroundings don’t disagree what the mechanics are. But why insist that the “feely” way is false or inferior?
Anything is potentially computy.which is analogous to panPROTOpsychism.
If it isn’t computing for me it isn’t computing?