In general it would be great if people were more knowledgeable, our conversations were more enlightened etc. etc. - no-one will disagree with that.
But I think there is a dangerous elitist fallacy lurking here somewhere. The validity of your opinion about subject X isn’t always strongly dependent on your knowledge of subject X. Let me make up a simple example. We have a choice between getting a red rock or a green rock. Some of us have a utility function that prefers red to green. Others have a utility function that prefers green to red. But a further group derives utility from complex molecular properties of rocks. Some of them have put forward elaborate arguments for why the red rock would satisfy that utility function better. Others have put forward elaborate arguments for the green rock. By contrast, the red-utility people and the green-utility people haven’t put forward any elaborate arguments. In fact they haven’t studied the issue much at all as it’s extremely straightforward to them. This irritates the teams with the elaborate arguments and they feel the first two groups aren’t really entitled to an opinion on which rock to pick. Yet, it seems to me that they are perfectly rational in how they approach the issue and have as much right to an opinion as the sophisticates.
And I don’t think this is a particularly contrived example—I see a similar thing in the debate on whether my European home country should use the euro as a currency or not. Some people oppose European integration on principle (they’re in favor of local government or they’re nationalists or whatever you want to call it) while others support integration on principle (they’re one-worlders or internationalists or whatever you want to call it). But then there are elaborate economic arguments on whether using the euro is of economic benefit to the country. The sophisticates really do tend to think that the people who haven’t immersed themselves in this economic debate aren’t entitled to an opinion on whether the euro should be used. I think that’s wrong.
I don’t see how it makes sense to reference nationalism or internationalism as terminal values. They are instrumental values, and their effects on a population’s happiness/fun/quality of life should be studied and discussed. There are other valid perspectives besides economics for evaluating the issue, such as the sense of community a system promotes, but when people state simply that they value a certain system as a terminal value, their only contribution is the anecdotal data about their own preference.
I think the analogy breaks down in that the utility of economic systems can be reduced to the utility of properties about people (the actual entities with values that could be represented by utility functions), which makes more sense than reducing the utility of reflected colors to the utility of the molecular structures that reflect those colors, rather than the utility of the effect of people perceiving those colors. (Of course, even the rock example can have problems, if the molecular structures have bigger impacts on people than perception of color, for example, if green rocks are toxic.)
I don’t exactly disagree but you’re upping the subtlety a bit. You’re arguing that people should not regard certain things as terminal values when making political decisions, things which I think in fact they do regard that way. But if I get to dress my sockpuppets up a bit I can have them say, “Fine, I agree that I’ll be a good utilitarian and try to maximize population happiness over time—but I think the long-term benefits of nationalism/integrationism clearly outweigh the marginal effects of short-term economic developments.” Then someone could argue against that point—and we would almost certainly have improved the political discourse. But the people with the original elaborate analyses of short-term economic effects would still have been just as wrong in their claimed superiority.
In any case, the general point I wanted to make can certainly be made in a formally correct way as long as you don’t insist that every rational intelligent being must have the same utility function.
In any case, the general point I wanted to make can certainly be made in a formally correct way as long as you don’t insist that every rational intelligent being must have the same utility function.
Certainly, when there is a genuine disagreement in utility functions, it is not reasonable to claim one’s own terminal values as privileged (in debate, that is; it is reasonable to personally act on one’s own values), but this does not apply when one’s stated values are not their terminal values. And it is reasonable to question whether this is so, to try to distinguish the two cases.
In general it would be great if people were more knowledgeable, our conversations were more enlightened etc. etc. - no-one will disagree with that.
But I think there is a dangerous elitist fallacy lurking here somewhere. The validity of your opinion about subject X isn’t always strongly dependent on your knowledge of subject X. Let me make up a simple example. We have a choice between getting a red rock or a green rock. Some of us have a utility function that prefers red to green. Others have a utility function that prefers green to red. But a further group derives utility from complex molecular properties of rocks. Some of them have put forward elaborate arguments for why the red rock would satisfy that utility function better. Others have put forward elaborate arguments for the green rock. By contrast, the red-utility people and the green-utility people haven’t put forward any elaborate arguments. In fact they haven’t studied the issue much at all as it’s extremely straightforward to them. This irritates the teams with the elaborate arguments and they feel the first two groups aren’t really entitled to an opinion on which rock to pick. Yet, it seems to me that they are perfectly rational in how they approach the issue and have as much right to an opinion as the sophisticates.
And I don’t think this is a particularly contrived example—I see a similar thing in the debate on whether my European home country should use the euro as a currency or not. Some people oppose European integration on principle (they’re in favor of local government or they’re nationalists or whatever you want to call it) while others support integration on principle (they’re one-worlders or internationalists or whatever you want to call it). But then there are elaborate economic arguments on whether using the euro is of economic benefit to the country. The sophisticates really do tend to think that the people who haven’t immersed themselves in this economic debate aren’t entitled to an opinion on whether the euro should be used. I think that’s wrong.
I don’t see how it makes sense to reference nationalism or internationalism as terminal values. They are instrumental values, and their effects on a population’s happiness/fun/quality of life should be studied and discussed. There are other valid perspectives besides economics for evaluating the issue, such as the sense of community a system promotes, but when people state simply that they value a certain system as a terminal value, their only contribution is the anecdotal data about their own preference.
I think the analogy breaks down in that the utility of economic systems can be reduced to the utility of properties about people (the actual entities with values that could be represented by utility functions), which makes more sense than reducing the utility of reflected colors to the utility of the molecular structures that reflect those colors, rather than the utility of the effect of people perceiving those colors. (Of course, even the rock example can have problems, if the molecular structures have bigger impacts on people than perception of color, for example, if green rocks are toxic.)
I don’t exactly disagree but you’re upping the subtlety a bit. You’re arguing that people should not regard certain things as terminal values when making political decisions, things which I think in fact they do regard that way. But if I get to dress my sockpuppets up a bit I can have them say, “Fine, I agree that I’ll be a good utilitarian and try to maximize population happiness over time—but I think the long-term benefits of nationalism/integrationism clearly outweigh the marginal effects of short-term economic developments.” Then someone could argue against that point—and we would almost certainly have improved the political discourse. But the people with the original elaborate analyses of short-term economic effects would still have been just as wrong in their claimed superiority.
In any case, the general point I wanted to make can certainly be made in a formally correct way as long as you don’t insist that every rational intelligent being must have the same utility function.
Certainly, when there is a genuine disagreement in utility functions, it is not reasonable to claim one’s own terminal values as privileged (in debate, that is; it is reasonable to personally act on one’s own values), but this does not apply when one’s stated values are not their terminal values. And it is reasonable to question whether this is so, to try to distinguish the two cases.