I agree that patternism contingently implies subjective immortality, but I agree with Oscar Cunningham that subjective immortality does not imply not-caring about death. I think patternism is stronger than beliefs that cause people to sign up for cryonics or step into the teleporter or read (even agree with) the QM sequence.
(I’m not convinced that the universe is large enough for patternism to actually imply subjective immortality.)
What cosmological assumptions? Assumptions related to identity, perhaps, as discussed here. But it seems to me that MWI essentially guarantees that for every observer-moment, there will always exist a “subsequent” one, and the same seems to apply to all levels of a Tegmark multiverse.
I don’t think MWI is sufficiently well defined or understood for it to be known whether or not that is implied. For example it would not be the case in Robin Hanson’s mangled worlds proposal, and no one knows whether that proposal is correct or not.
“subjective immortality does not imply not-caring about death.”
Sure. You can care about whatever you want to care about, no matter what is the case. But even my version mostly prevents me from caring about death except in fairly short term ways; e.g. I don’t bother to do things that would extend my lifespan, even when I know about them. And I definitely would not bother with cryonics.
I agree that patternism contingently implies subjective immortality, but I agree with Oscar Cunningham that subjective immortality does not imply not-caring about death. I think patternism is stronger than beliefs that cause people to sign up for cryonics or step into the teleporter or read (even agree with) the QM sequence.
(I’m not convinced that the universe is large enough for patternism to actually imply subjective immortality.)
(Fgvchyngvat ynetr-havirefr cnggreavfz.) Gurer’f na vafgnagvngvba bs zl cnggrea gung unf gur fhowrpgvir rkcrevrapr bs orvat tvira narfgurfvn naq erznvavat pbafpvbhf. Gurer’f znal bs gubfr. Ohg vg’f abg gur vafgnagvngvba gung rkvfgf ba rnegu, juvpu unf gur fhowrpgvir rkcrevrapr bs orvat tvira narfgurfvn naq gura jnxvat hc. Nyfb, nyzbfg nyy bs gubfr bgure cnggreaf qrpburer vagb fbzrguvat ragveryl hayvxr gur cnggrea ba rnegu.
Why wouldn’t it be? That conclusion follows logically from many physical theories that are currently taken quite seriously.
Such as? Subjective immortality isn’t implied by MWI without further cosmological assumptions.
What cosmological assumptions? Assumptions related to identity, perhaps, as discussed here. But it seems to me that MWI essentially guarantees that for every observer-moment, there will always exist a “subsequent” one, and the same seems to apply to all levels of a Tegmark multiverse.
I don’t think MWI is sufficiently well defined or understood for it to be known whether or not that is implied. For example it would not be the case in Robin Hanson’s mangled worlds proposal, and no one knows whether that proposal is correct or not.
Fair enough. I have no argument and low confidence, it just seems vaguely implausible.
“subjective immortality does not imply not-caring about death.”
Sure. You can care about whatever you want to care about, no matter what is the case. But even my version mostly prevents me from caring about death except in fairly short term ways; e.g. I don’t bother to do things that would extend my lifespan, even when I know about them. And I definitely would not bother with cryonics.