Yes, that sometimes happens when you reduce something; it turns out that there’s nothing left. Nobody would say that there is no reductionist account of phlogiston.
That may be so (though I agree with Peter, that reduction and elimination are different), but regardless Dennett’s actual argument is not a reduction of qualia to more simple terms. He argued (mostly on conceptual grounds) that the idea of qualia is incoherent. Even if elimination (in the manner of phlogiston) were reduction, Dennett’s argument wouldn’t be a case of either.
OK, I think I agree with this view of Dennett. I hadn’t read the book in a while, and I conflated his reduction of consciousness (which is, I think, a genuine reduction) with his explanation of qualia.
I am not saying that all posits are doomed to elimination, only that what is elemintated tends to be a posit rather
than a prima facie phenomenon. How could you say that there is no heat? I also don’t agree that qualia are posits...but Dennett of course needs to portray them that way in order to eliminate them.
I don’t think I understand what you think is and isn’t a “posit”. “Cold” is a prima facie phenomenon as well, but it has been subsumed entirely into the concept of “heat”.
The prima-facie phenomenon of “cold” (as in “your hands feel cold”) has been subsumed under the scientific theory of heat-as-random-molecular-motion. That’s reduction. it was never eilmininated in favour of the prima-facie phenomenn of heat, as in “This soup is hot”.
Only minorly. We could just as well still talk about phlogiston, which is just negative oxygen. The difference between reduction and elimination is just that in the latter, we do not think the concept is useful anymore. If there are different “we”s involved, you might have the same analysis result in both.
Only minorly. We could just as well still talk about phlogiston, which is just negative oxygen.
Not very menaingfully. What does that mean in terms of modern physics? Negatively ionised oxygen? Anti-oxygen? Negatively massive oxygen?
The difference between reduction and elimination is just that in the latter, we do not think the concept is useful anymore
Well, that’s a difference.
Only minorly.
Is it minority opinion that reductive materialism and eliminative materialism are different positions?
“The reductive materialist contrasts the eliminativist more strongly, arguing that a mental state is well defined, and that further research will result in a more detailed, but not different understanding.[3]”—WP
Heat was reduced, phlogiston was eliminated. There is heat. There is no phlogiston.
That is the reductionist account of phlogiston. The grandparent didn’t claim that everyone would agree that there is a reduction of phlogiston that makes sense. The result of reduction is that phlogiston was eliminated. Which sometimes happens when you try to reduce things.
This is what the grandparent was saying. You were in agreement already.
It;s an emlimination. If it were a reduction, there would still be phlogiston as is there is still heat.
The reductive explanation of combustion did not need phlogiston as a posit, so it was eliminated. Note the difference
beteen phlogiston, a posit, and heat/combustion, which are prima-facie phenomena. Nobody was trying to
reductivley explain phlogiston, they were trying to explain heat with it.
That was elimination.
Yes, that sometimes happens when you reduce something; it turns out that there’s nothing left. Nobody would say that there is no reductionist account of phlogiston.
That may be so (though I agree with Peter, that reduction and elimination are different), but regardless Dennett’s actual argument is not a reduction of qualia to more simple terms. He argued (mostly on conceptual grounds) that the idea of qualia is incoherent. Even if elimination (in the manner of phlogiston) were reduction, Dennett’s argument wouldn’t be a case of either.
OK, I think I agree with this view of Dennett. I hadn’t read the book in a while, and I conflated his reduction of consciousness (which is, I think, a genuine reduction) with his explanation of qualia.
I would. Reduction and elimination are clearly different. Heat was reduced, phlogiston was eliminated. There is heat. There is no phlogiston.
So in this case, in your view, subjective experiences would be reduced, while qualia would be eliminated?
I am not saying that all posits are doomed to elimination, only that what is elemintated tends to be a posit rather than a prima facie phenomenon. How could you say that there is no heat? I also don’t agree that qualia are posits...but Dennett of course needs to portray them that way in order to eliminate them.
I don’t think I understand what you think is and isn’t a “posit”. “Cold” is a prima facie phenomenon as well, but it has been subsumed entirely into the concept of “heat”.
The prima-facie phenomenon of “cold” (as in “your hands feel cold”) has been subsumed under the scientific theory of heat-as-random-molecular-motion. That’s reduction. it was never eilmininated in favour of the prima-facie phenomenn of heat, as in “This soup is hot”.
Only minorly. We could just as well still talk about phlogiston, which is just negative oxygen. The difference between reduction and elimination is just that in the latter, we do not think the concept is useful anymore. If there are different “we”s involved, you might have the same analysis result in both.
Not very menaingfully. What does that mean in terms of modern physics? Negatively ionised oxygen? Anti-oxygen? Negatively massive oxygen?
Well, that’s a difference.
Is it minority opinion that reductive materialism and eliminative materialism are different positions?
“The reductive materialist contrasts the eliminativist more strongly, arguing that a mental state is well defined, and that further research will result in a more detailed, but not different understanding.[3]”—WP
That is the reductionist account of phlogiston. The grandparent didn’t claim that everyone would agree that there is a reduction of phlogiston that makes sense. The result of reduction is that phlogiston was eliminated. Which sometimes happens when you try to reduce things.
This is what the grandparent was saying. You were in agreement already.
It;s an emlimination. If it were a reduction, there would still be phlogiston as is there is still heat. The reductive explanation of combustion did not need phlogiston as a posit, so it was eliminated. Note the difference beteen phlogiston, a posit, and heat/combustion, which are prima-facie phenomena. Nobody was trying to reductivley explain phlogiston, they were trying to explain heat with it.
I disagree.
Please, just read this.