Okay, I can see that I need to spell out in more detail one of the ideas here—namely that you’re trying to generalize over a repeating type of causal link and that reference is pinned down by such generalization.
Somewhat tangentially, I’d like to point out that simply bringing up relative frequencies of different types of events in discussion doesn’t make one a crypto-frequentist—the Bayesian approach doesn’t bar relative frequencies from consideration. In contrast, frequentism does deprecate the use of mathematical probability as a model or representation of degrees of belief/plausibility.
Er, no, they’re called Dynamic Bayes Nets. And there are no known unique events relative to the fundamental laws of physics; those would be termed “miracles”. Physics repeats perfectly—there’s no question of frequentism because there’s no probabilities—and the higher-level complex events are one-time if you try to measure them precisely; Socrates died only once, etc.
So in the end, we’re back a frequentism.
Also, what about unique events?
Somewhat tangentially, I’d like to point out that simply bringing up relative frequencies of different types of events in discussion doesn’t make one a crypto-frequentist—the Bayesian approach doesn’t bar relative frequencies from consideration. In contrast, frequentism does deprecate the use of mathematical probability as a model or representation of degrees of belief/plausibility.
Er, no, they’re called Dynamic Bayes Nets. And there are no known unique events relative to the fundamental laws of physics; those would be termed “miracles”. Physics repeats perfectly—there’s no question of frequentism because there’s no probabilities—and the higher-level complex events are one-time if you try to measure them precisely; Socrates died only once, etc.
What about some of the things going on at the LHC?