I think it’s meant as a rationality test for those who say voting is pointless. If you consider voting pointless but value being 10c richer at least a little bit, then on Liron’s premises you should maybe be willing to vote whichever way gets you the 10c.
(I am unconvinced, for reasons I’ve given in another comment on the OP. Also because people may reasonably value voting for “internal” reasons: it makes them feel like fuller participants in their society, or something.)
It is possible to consider the value of voting to be more than 10 cents but less than the logistical inconveniences which are there in the real world but Liron assumed away.
I consider voting pointless according to my “utility function,” if I am measuring the benefit to society that results from the fact that I voted for a particular candidate, basically because I have to take into account 1) the probability that I am mistaken about the better candidate, and 2) the bounded character of my utility function, which means that a small probability of affecting the outcome really does mean small total utility.
Given those facts, if I choose from that utility function alone, from a baseline position I would not vote at all, and I would be willing to vote for any candidate, including Trump, for a relatively small sum of money.
However, I am not a utilitarian in the first place, and apart from that, even if I were, I would have to take into account the effects on my character, as in your argument.
If you consider voting pointless but value being 10c richer at least a little bit, then on Liron’s premises you should maybe be willing to vote whichever way gets you the 10c.
Only in the simplified abstract model of the situation. In reality things like the ability to brag that you did (or did not) vote for that bastard (or that bitch) or, say, even minor shifts in self-perception are worth more than 10c.
The point is that if you don’t know my value system you cannot say what would or would not be rational for me to do.
I think it’s meant as a rationality test for those who say voting is pointless. If you consider voting pointless but value being 10c richer at least a little bit, then on Liron’s premises you should maybe be willing to vote whichever way gets you the 10c.
(I am unconvinced, for reasons I’ve given in another comment on the OP. Also because people may reasonably value voting for “internal” reasons: it makes them feel like fuller participants in their society, or something.)
It is possible to consider the value of voting to be more than 10 cents but less than the logistical inconveniences which are there in the real world but Liron assumed away.
I consider voting pointless according to my “utility function,” if I am measuring the benefit to society that results from the fact that I voted for a particular candidate, basically because I have to take into account 1) the probability that I am mistaken about the better candidate, and 2) the bounded character of my utility function, which means that a small probability of affecting the outcome really does mean small total utility.
Given those facts, if I choose from that utility function alone, from a baseline position I would not vote at all, and I would be willing to vote for any candidate, including Trump, for a relatively small sum of money.
However, I am not a utilitarian in the first place, and apart from that, even if I were, I would have to take into account the effects on my character, as in your argument.
Only in the simplified abstract model of the situation. In reality things like the ability to brag that you did (or did not) vote for that bastard (or that bitch) or, say, even minor shifts in self-perception are worth more than 10c.
The point is that if you don’t know my value system you cannot say what would or would not be rational for me to do.