What you’re really doing by saying “My utility function might value my self-perception as a person who votes for X” is phrasing virtue ethics as utilitarianism. That’s a move which confuses rather than clarifies. If you value your self-perception as a person who votes for X, you aren’t a consequentialist; you believe in virtue ethics.
Can you say it? Yes; you can in theory be a virtue utilitarian. But no real-life virtue ethicists are utilitarians. Hence, confusion.
Why would valuing a particular aspect of my self-perception be virtue ethics? I’m not saying I’m becaming morally better, only that it provides more warm glow, that is, just feels more pleasant.
What you’re really doing by saying “My utility function might value my self-perception as a person who votes for X” is phrasing virtue ethics as utilitarianism. That’s a move which confuses rather than clarifies. If you value your self-perception as a person who votes for X, you aren’t a consequentialist; you believe in virtue ethics.
Can you say it? Yes; you can in theory be a virtue utilitarian. But no real-life virtue ethicists are utilitarians. Hence, confusion.
Why would valuing a particular aspect of my self-perception be virtue ethics? I’m not saying I’m becaming morally better, only that it provides more warm glow, that is, just feels more pleasant.