I don’t have a preference for coherence. That’s not a value. It’s just part of the meaning of value, that it must be coherent.
I haven’t given a rigorous definition for coherence, but I’ve given some criteria—a coherent concept should be capable of explanation, and so far that’s not been met.
Definitions aren’t true or false, they can be representative of what people mean by certain words to a greater or lesser extent. If you poll people and ask if values can be incoherent and still valid I expect most to say no?
> I am just pointing out that you don’t get to dictate to others what their values should be.
For coherent values, sure. But a preference for something incoherent to be correct doesn’t seem like a real value to me.
>You need a real mount Everest to climb mount Everest.
But not to have the experience of climbing mount Everest.
>And haven’t you said that you are not an anti-realist?
Yes, realism is incoherent. If you disagree, at least some of the burden should fall on you to define it or explain why it’s a useful concept.
You haven’t defined incoherence, and you are also treating the preference for coherence like an objective value anyone must have.
I don’t have a preference for coherence. That’s not a value. It’s just part of the meaning of value, that it must be coherent.
I haven’t given a rigorous definition for coherence, but I’ve given some criteria—a coherent concept should be capable of explanation, and so far that’s not been met.
Is there some experiment or observation that proves that statement to be true?
Definitions aren’t true or false, they can be representative of what people mean by certain words to a greater or lesser extent. If you poll people and ask if values can be incoherent and still valid I expect most to say no?
So you are almost but not quite saying that there is a separate category of analytical truths.