I only apply my principle to ontological statements, as explained in OP. And ontological statements never constrain expectations. So they are equivalent under these conditions.
But you shouldn’t apply your beliefs to ontological statements . If the problem with ontological statements is that they don’t constrain beliefs, it’s unreasonable to except other statements that don’t constrain beliefs.
My problem with ontological statements is they don’t appear to be meaningful.
Don’t confuse the historical verification principle with the reasons for believing it. Those reasons apply to ontological statements and not to other statements.
My problem with ontological statements is they don’t appear to be meaningful.
You certainly started by making a direct appeal to your own intuition. Such an argument can be refuted by intuiting differently.
Those reasons apply to ontological statements and not to other statements.
You don’t have any systematic argument to that effect. Other verificationist s might, but you don’t.
There’s a tradition of justifying the verification principle as an analytical truth, for instance. Your rr invention of verificationism is worse than the original .
You certainly started by making a direct appeal to your own intuition. Such an argument can be refuted by intuiting differently.
I’ve made a number of different arguments. You can respond by taking ontological terms as primitive, but as I’ve argued there’s strong reasons for rejecting that.
You don’t have any systematic argument to that effect
Of course I do. Every one of the arguments I’ve put forward clearly applies only to the kinds of ontological statements I’m talking about. If an argument I believed was broader, then I’d believe a broader class of statements was meaningless. If you disagree, which specific argument of mine (not conclusion) doesn’t?
I’m not interested in analytical definitions right now. That’s how Quine argued against it and I don’t care about that construction.
You can respond by taking ontological terms as primitive,
That’s not what I said. I said that you made a claim based on nothing but intuition, and that a contrary claim based on nothing but intuition is neither better nor worse than it.
Every one of the arguments I’ve put forward clearly applies only to the kinds of ontological statements
The argument that if it has no observable consequences, it is meaningless does not apply to only ontological statements.
> said that you made a claim based on nothing but intuition
This isn’t true—I’ve made numerous arguments for this claim not purely based on intuition.
>The argument that if it has no observable consequences, it is meaningless does not apply to only ontological statements.
I did not make this argument. This is a conclusion that’s argued for, not an argument, and the arguments for this conclusion only apply to ontological statements.
This isn’t true—I’ve made numerous arguments for this claim not purely based on intuition.
I didn’t say that the only argument you made was based on intuition. I said that you made an a argument based on intuition, ie. one of your arguments was.
the arguments for this conclusion only apply to ontological statements.
Why? Because your intuition doesn’t tell you that an undecidable statement is meaningless unless it is ontological?
Well, maybe it doesn’t , after all anyone can intuit any thing. That’s the problem with intuition.
The early verificationist had a different problem: they argued for the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements systematically , but ran into trouble when the verificationist principle turned out be meaningless in its own terms.
Why? Because your intuition doesn’t tell you that an undecidable statement is meaningless unless it is ontological?
No, because the specific arguments only work for ontological statements. E.g. the multiverse argument only works for the subset of ontological claims that are true in only some worlds.
My problem with ontological statements is they don’t appear to be meaningful.
Don’t confuse the historical verification principle with the reasons for believing it. Those reasons apply to ontological statements and not to other statements.
Yeah, I don’t know. Don’t take this as a moderator warning (yet), but usually when discussions reach the “one-sentence accusation of fallacy” stage it’s usually best to disengage. I haven’t had time to read this whole thread to figure out exactly what happened, but I don’t want either of you to waste a ton of time in unproductive discussion.
I only apply my principle to ontological statements, as explained in OP. And ontological statements never constrain expectations. So they are equivalent under these conditions.
But you shouldn’t apply your beliefs to ontological statements . If the problem with ontological statements is that they don’t constrain beliefs, it’s unreasonable to except other statements that don’t constrain beliefs.
My problem with ontological statements is they don’t appear to be meaningful.
Don’t confuse the historical verification principle with the reasons for believing it. Those reasons apply to ontological statements and not to other statements.
You certainly started by making a direct appeal to your own intuition. Such an argument can be refuted by intuiting differently.
You don’t have any systematic argument to that effect. Other verificationist s might, but you don’t.
There’s a tradition of justifying the verification principle as an analytical truth, for instance. Your rr invention of verificationism is worse than the original .
I’ve made a number of different arguments. You can respond by taking ontological terms as primitive, but as I’ve argued there’s strong reasons for rejecting that.
Of course I do. Every one of the arguments I’ve put forward clearly applies only to the kinds of ontological statements I’m talking about. If an argument I believed was broader, then I’d believe a broader class of statements was meaningless. If you disagree, which specific argument of mine (not conclusion) doesn’t?
I’m not interested in analytical definitions right now. That’s how Quine argued against it and I don’t care about that construction.
That’s not what I said. I said that you made a claim based on nothing but intuition, and that a contrary claim based on nothing but intuition is neither better nor worse than it.
The argument that if it has no observable consequences, it is meaningless does not apply to only ontological statements.
> said that you made a claim based on nothing but intuition
This isn’t true—I’ve made numerous arguments for this claim not purely based on intuition.
>The argument that if it has no observable consequences, it is meaningless does not apply to only ontological statements.
I did not make this argument. This is a conclusion that’s argued for, not an argument, and the arguments for this conclusion only apply to ontological statements.
I didn’t say that the only argument you made was based on intuition. I said that you made an a argument based on intuition, ie. one of your arguments was.
Why? Because your intuition doesn’t tell you that an undecidable statement is meaningless unless it is ontological?
Well, maybe it doesn’t , after all anyone can intuit any thing. That’s the problem with intuition.
The early verificationist had a different problem: they argued for the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements systematically , but ran into trouble when the verificationist principle turned out be meaningless in its own terms.
No, because the specific arguments only work for ontological statements. E.g. the multiverse argument only works for the subset of ontological claims that are true in only some worlds.
The multiverse argument is
Ontological propositions are unverifiable
Unverifiable propositions are meaningless.
2 would apply to any unverifiable statement.
No, I never took 1 or 2 as a premise. Read it again.
My problem with ontological statements is they don’t appear to be meaningful.
Don’t confuse the historical verification principle with the reasons for believing it. Those reasons apply to ontological statements and not to other statements.
“appear to be”
Yes, in many ways, with extended arguments. What exactly is your issue?
Appeal to personal intuition.
Yeah, I don’t know. Don’t take this as a moderator warning (yet), but usually when discussions reach the “one-sentence accusation of fallacy” stage it’s usually best to disengage. I haven’t had time to read this whole thread to figure out exactly what happened, but I don’t want either of you to waste a ton of time in unproductive discussion.
I don’t believe I’ve done that.