We could solve it if we move from binary idea of identity, which only can be 0 or 1, me or not me, to continuous idea of identity, which could have many gradation. In this case we should ask how similar the copy will be to the original or what is the probability that I find my self in the next moment to be that copy.
The main problems with identity is that it is wrong notion. It assumes that set of all possible observer is divided on many subset of observers, which are identical inside that subsets.
But the idea identity is only useful to answer questions like “what I will feel in next moment”. Most such question could be answered without binary conception of identity.
Any way I suggest ti stick for now to conservative approach to identity problem—see comment above.
In case of DI, we should collect as much information as possible.
The evidence provided of any dead person produces a distribution on human brains, given enough computation. The more evidence there is, the more focused the distribution. Given post-scarcity, the FAI could simply produce many samples on each distribution.
This is certainly a clever way of producing mind-neighbors. I find problems with these sorts of schemes for resurrection, though. Socioeconomic privilege, tragedy of the commons, and data rot, to be precise.
It could be solved by acasual trading between parallel worlds. I tried to explain it in the map under the title that DI stalks well with many world immortality.
If we have infinitely many worlds with the same evidence about the person ( but the person is different in different world, only the evidence is the same), we could create only one resurrection in each world which is in agreement with this evidence, AND it will be exact resurrection of the person from another world.
BUT, the person from this world will be exact resurrected in the another world, so each person will have exact resurrection in some world, and each world will have only one person which much its evidence. (So, no problems with ethics and resources.)
I think that it may be difficult to explain this in several lines, but I hope you grasp the idea. If it is not clear I could try better explanation.
If we don’t know 100 bits of information, we need to create 2 power 100 copies to fill all gaps. Even for FAI it may be difficult. Also it may be unpleasant to the copies themselves, as it would delude their value to outside world.
If a gap is about very important feature or a secret event, it could be two completely different people. Like if we don’t know if a person of interest was a gay.
...Okay? One in ten sampled individuals will be gay. You can do that. Does it really matter when you’re resurrecting the dead?
Your own proposal is to only sample one, and call the inaccuracy “acausal trade,” which isn’t even necessary in this case. The AI is missing 100 bits. You’re already admitting many-worlds. So the AI can simply draw those 100 bits out of quantum randomness, and in each Everett branch, there will be a different individual. The incorrect ones you could call “acausal travelers,” even though you’re just wrong. There will still be the “correct” individual, the exact descendant of this reality’s instance, in one of the Everett branches. The fact that it is “correct” doesn’t even matter, there is only ever “close enough,” but the “correct” one is there.
I think that there is 3 option in case of incomplete information.
Do not resurrect at all.
Resurrect one individual, filling gaps with random quantum noise.
Resurrect all possible individuals with all combinations of noise.
I suggest to choose variant 2. In this case everybody is happy. The subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes. Each universe get a person which corresponds its conditions and do not get useless semi-copies of the subject.
Resurrect one individual, filling gaps with random quantum noise.
Resurrect all possible individuals with all combinations of noise.
That is a false trichotomy. You’re perfectly capable of deciding to resurrect some sparse coverage of the distribution, and those differences are not useless. In addition, “the subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes” is true of both two and three, and you don’t have to refer to spooky alternate histories to do it in the first place.
So, as I understood you, you stay for resurrecting of “sparse coverage of the distribution”, which will help to prevent exponential explosion of number of copies, but will cover most peculiar of possible copies landscape?
While I can support this case, I see the following problem: For example, I have a partner X, which will better preserved via cryonics, but my information will be partly lost. If there will be created 1000 semi-copies of me to cover the distribution, 999 of them will be without partner X, and partner X also will suffer because ve will now care for other my copies. (Ve could also be copied, but it would require coping of all world).
If it were my choice, I prefer to lose some of my memories or personal traits than to live in the world with many my copies.
I think that there is 3 option in case of incomplete information.
Do not resurrect at all.
Resurrect one individual, filling gaps with random quantum noise.
Resurrect all possible individuals with all combinations of noise.
I suggest to choose variant 2. In this case everybody is happy. The subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes. Each universe get a person which corresponds its conditions and do not get useless semi-copies of the subject.
We could solve it if we move from binary idea of identity, which only can be 0 or 1, me or not me, to continuous idea of identity, which could have many gradation. In this case we should ask how similar the copy will be to the original or what is the probability that I find my self in the next moment to be that copy. The main problems with identity is that it is wrong notion. It assumes that set of all possible observer is divided on many subset of observers, which are identical inside that subsets. But the idea identity is only useful to answer questions like “what I will feel in next moment”. Most such question could be answered without binary conception of identity. Any way I suggest ti stick for now to conservative approach to identity problem—see comment above.
In case of DI, we should collect as much information as possible.
The evidence provided of any dead person produces a distribution on human brains, given enough computation. The more evidence there is, the more focused the distribution. Given post-scarcity, the FAI could simply produce many samples on each distribution.
This is certainly a clever way of producing mind-neighbors. I find problems with these sorts of schemes for resurrection, though. Socioeconomic privilege, tragedy of the commons, and data rot, to be precise.
It could be solved by acasual trading between parallel worlds. I tried to explain it in the map under the title that DI stalks well with many world immortality.
If we have infinitely many worlds with the same evidence about the person ( but the person is different in different world, only the evidence is the same), we could create only one resurrection in each world which is in agreement with this evidence, AND it will be exact resurrection of the person from another world.
BUT, the person from this world will be exact resurrected in the another world, so each person will have exact resurrection in some world, and each world will have only one person which much its evidence. (So, no problems with ethics and resources.)
I think that it may be difficult to explain this in several lines, but I hope you grasp the idea. If it is not clear I could try better explanation.
No, that’s easy to grasp. I just wonder what the point is. Conservation of resources?
If we don’t know 100 bits of information, we need to create 2 power 100 copies to fill all gaps. Even for FAI it may be difficult. Also it may be unpleasant to the copies themselves, as it would delude their value to outside world.
What’s wrong with gaps? This is probabilistic in the first place.
If a gap is about very important feature or a secret event, it could be two completely different people. Like if we don’t know if a person of interest was a gay.
...Okay? One in ten sampled individuals will be gay. You can do that. Does it really matter when you’re resurrecting the dead?
Your own proposal is to only sample one, and call the inaccuracy “acausal trade,” which isn’t even necessary in this case. The AI is missing 100 bits. You’re already admitting many-worlds. So the AI can simply draw those 100 bits out of quantum randomness, and in each Everett branch, there will be a different individual. The incorrect ones you could call “acausal travelers,” even though you’re just wrong. There will still be the “correct” individual, the exact descendant of this reality’s instance, in one of the Everett branches. The fact that it is “correct” doesn’t even matter, there is only ever “close enough,” but the “correct” one is there.
I think that there is 3 option in case of incomplete information.
Do not resurrect at all.
Resurrect one individual, filling gaps with random quantum noise.
Resurrect all possible individuals with all combinations of noise.
I suggest to choose variant 2. In this case everybody is happy. The subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes. Each universe get a person which corresponds its conditions and do not get useless semi-copies of the subject.
That is a false trichotomy. You’re perfectly capable of deciding to resurrect some sparse coverage of the distribution, and those differences are not useless. In addition, “the subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes” is true of both two and three, and you don’t have to refer to spooky alternate histories to do it in the first place.
So, as I understood you, you stay for resurrecting of “sparse coverage of the distribution”, which will help to prevent exponential explosion of number of copies, but will cover most peculiar of possible copies landscape?
While I can support this case, I see the following problem: For example, I have a partner X, which will better preserved via cryonics, but my information will be partly lost. If there will be created 1000 semi-copies of me to cover the distribution, 999 of them will be without partner X, and partner X also will suffer because ve will now care for other my copies. (Ve could also be copied, but it would require coping of all world).
If it were my choice, I prefer to lose some of my memories or personal traits than to live in the world with many my copies.
Why would that be the case? And if it were the case, why would that be a problem?
I think that there is 3 option in case of incomplete information.
Do not resurrect at all.
Resurrect one individual, filling gaps with random quantum noise.
Resurrect all possible individuals with all combinations of noise.
I suggest to choose variant 2. In this case everybody is happy. The subject is almost exactly resurrected in one of the universes. Each universe get a person which corresponds its conditions and do not get useless semi-copies of the subject.