When you start doing object level science, recursion goes away entirely. By contrast, object level morality never gets away from morality. As you noted, it is impossible to say whether we’ve made moral progress without referencing what moral position is better.
I don’t know what you mean by “object level morality never gets away from morality”. Read literally, that’s tautologically true, but I don’t see the relevance. Is this a typo?
Also, I’m not seeing the distinction here. When I’m engaged in object-level moral reasoning, or when I read examples of object-level moral reasoning on blogs or in newspapers, I very rarely come across recursion or circular justification. There’s usually an assumption that everyone in the community agrees that certain sorts of fundamental moral inferences are justified, and the debate is about whether those inferences can be made in a particular case. Here is a classic example of object-level moral reasoning. MLK offers a number of justifications for his moral stance on this particular issue. None of these justifications, as far as I can see, are circular. I don’t think this is atypical. Of course, if you think that every moral argument must also simultaneously justify the whole enterprise of objective moral evaluation, then every moral argument will have a circular component. But this places a disproportionately large burden on moral justification.
It’s true that if I want to argue that we have made moral progress I need to take for granted certain moral standards of evaluation, but if I want to argue that we have made scientific progress I need to take for granted certain scientific standards of evaluation. The only difference I can see is that the moral assumptions are as a matter of fact more contentious than the scientific ones, so perhaps moral debate breaks down on disagreement about foundational assumptions more often. But this is at least partly because most scientific debate is usually conducted in an institutional setting that has various mechanisms for consensus formation and weeding out sufficiently recalcitrant dissenters. Outside this setting, debate about descriptive issues is often just as contentious as moral debate. I know a number of new-agey people who have completely bizarre standards of epistemic justification. My discussion with them quite often breaks down on disagreement about foundational assumptions.
There’s usually an assumption that everyone in the community agrees that certain sorts of fundamental moral inferences are justified, and the debate is about whether those inferences can be made in a particular case.
That’s not my sense at all. Moral inferences are fairly easy (compared to cutting-edge scientific inferences). Toy example: If God wants us to attend church, the inference that church attendance should be compelled by the government follows quite easy. There are secondary negative effects, but the only reason to care about them is if the moral assertion that God wants church attendance is false.
When I read political arguments, they almost always operate by assuming agreement on the moral premise. When that assumption is falsified, the argument falls apart. Even for fairly ordinary moral disputes, the argument is usually based on moral principle, not facts or moral inference.
By contrast, equivalently basic scientific questions are fact and inference based. To decide how much weight a bridge can carry, knowing the strength of the steel and the design of the bridge is most of the work. In practice, those types of disputes don’t devolve into arguments about whether gravity is going to work this time.
There are secondary negative effects, but the only reason to care about them is if the moral assertion that God wants church attendance is false.
Unless the secondary effects were that people are more likely to eat bacon for breakfast that day now that they aren’t able to sleep in and it also happens that God doesn’t want people to eat pigs.
I don’t know what you mean by “object level morality never gets away from morality”. Read literally, that’s tautologically true, but I don’t see the relevance. Is this a typo?
Also, I’m not seeing the distinction here. When I’m engaged in object-level moral reasoning, or when I read examples of object-level moral reasoning on blogs or in newspapers, I very rarely come across recursion or circular justification. There’s usually an assumption that everyone in the community agrees that certain sorts of fundamental moral inferences are justified, and the debate is about whether those inferences can be made in a particular case. Here is a classic example of object-level moral reasoning. MLK offers a number of justifications for his moral stance on this particular issue. None of these justifications, as far as I can see, are circular. I don’t think this is atypical. Of course, if you think that every moral argument must also simultaneously justify the whole enterprise of objective moral evaluation, then every moral argument will have a circular component. But this places a disproportionately large burden on moral justification.
It’s true that if I want to argue that we have made moral progress I need to take for granted certain moral standards of evaluation, but if I want to argue that we have made scientific progress I need to take for granted certain scientific standards of evaluation. The only difference I can see is that the moral assumptions are as a matter of fact more contentious than the scientific ones, so perhaps moral debate breaks down on disagreement about foundational assumptions more often. But this is at least partly because most scientific debate is usually conducted in an institutional setting that has various mechanisms for consensus formation and weeding out sufficiently recalcitrant dissenters. Outside this setting, debate about descriptive issues is often just as contentious as moral debate. I know a number of new-agey people who have completely bizarre standards of epistemic justification. My discussion with them quite often breaks down on disagreement about foundational assumptions.
Yes, typo corrected.
That’s not my sense at all. Moral inferences are fairly easy (compared to cutting-edge scientific inferences). Toy example: If God wants us to attend church, the inference that church attendance should be compelled by the government follows quite easy. There are secondary negative effects, but the only reason to care about them is if the moral assertion that God wants church attendance is false.
When I read political arguments, they almost always operate by assuming agreement on the moral premise. When that assumption is falsified, the argument falls apart. Even for fairly ordinary moral disputes, the argument is usually based on moral principle, not facts or moral inference.
By contrast, equivalently basic scientific questions are fact and inference based. To decide how much weight a bridge can carry, knowing the strength of the steel and the design of the bridge is most of the work. In practice, those types of disputes don’t devolve into arguments about whether gravity is going to work this time.
Unless the secondary effects were that people are more likely to eat bacon for breakfast that day now that they aren’t able to sleep in and it also happens that God doesn’t want people to eat pigs.