Fair point about the experience itself vs its description. But note that all the controversy is about the descriptions. “Qualia” is a descriptor, “sensation” is a descriptor, etc. Even “illusionists” about qualia don’t deny that people experience things.
Conversely, Camp #2 is convinced that there is an experience thing that exists in a fundamental way. There’s no agreement on what this thing is – some postulate causally active non-material stuff, whereas others agree with Camp #1 that there’s nothing operating outside the laws of physics – but they all agree that there is something that needs explaining. Moreover, even if consciousness is compatible with the laws of physics, it still poses a conceptual mystery relative to our current understanding. A complete solution (if it is even possible) may also have a nontrivial metaphysical component.
I think a lot of Camp #2 people want to introduce new metaphysics, which is why I don’t want to take out the last sentence.
But note that all the controversy is about the descriptions. “Qualia” is a descriptor, “sensation” is a descriptor, etc. Even “illusionists” about qualia don’t deny that people experience things.
I don’t think this is true. E.g., Dennett has these bits in Consciousness Explained: 1, 2, 3, 4.
Of course, the issue is still tricky, and you’re definitely not the only one who thinks it’s just a matter of description, not existence. Almost everyone agrees that something exists, but Camp #2 people tend to want something to exist over and above the reports of that thing, and Dennett seems to deny this. And (as I mentioned in some other comment) part of the point of this post is that you empirically cannot nail down exactly what this thing is in a way that makes sense to everyone. But I think it’s reasonable to say that Dennet doesn’t think people experience things.
Also, Dennett in particular says that there is no ground truth as to what you experience, and this is arguably a pretty well-defined property that’s in contradiction with the idea that the experience itself exists. Like, I think Camp #2 people will generally hold that, even if errors can come in during the reports of experience, there is still always a precise fact of the matter as to what is being experienced. And depending on their metaphysics, it would be possible to figure out what exactly that is with the right neurotech.
And another reason why I don’t think it’s true is because then I think illusionism wouldn’t matter for ethics, but as I mentioned in the post, there are some illusionists who think their position implies moral nihilism. (There are also people who differentiate illusionism and eliminativism based on this point, but I’m guessing you didn’t mean to do that.)
this [that there is no ground truth as to what you experience] is arguably a pretty well-defined property that’s in contradiction with the idea that the experience itself exists.
I beg to differ. The thrust of Dennett’s statement is easily interpreted as the truth of a description being partially constituted by the subject’s acceptance of the description. E.g., in one of the snippets/bits you cite, “I seem to see a pink ring.” If the subject said “I seem to see a reddish oval”, perhaps that would have been true. But compare:
My freely drinking tea rather than coffee is partially constituted by saying to my host “tea, please.” Yet there is still an actual event of my freely drinking tea. Even though if I had said “coffee, please” I probably would have drunk coffee instead.
We are getting into a zone where it is hard to tell what is a verbal issue and what is a substantive one. (And in my view, that’s because the distinction is inherently fuzzy.) But that’s life.
Fair point about the experience itself vs its description. But note that all the controversy is about the descriptions. “Qualia” is a descriptor, “sensation” is a descriptor, etc. Even “illusionists” about qualia don’t deny that people experience things.
Alright, so I changed the paragraph into this:
I think a lot of Camp #2 people want to introduce new metaphysics, which is why I don’t want to take out the last sentence.
I don’t think this is true. E.g., Dennett has these bits in Consciousness Explained: 1, 2, 3, 4.
Of course, the issue is still tricky, and you’re definitely not the only one who thinks it’s just a matter of description, not existence. Almost everyone agrees that something exists, but Camp #2 people tend to want something to exist over and above the reports of that thing, and Dennett seems to deny this. And (as I mentioned in some other comment) part of the point of this post is that you empirically cannot nail down exactly what this thing is in a way that makes sense to everyone. But I think it’s reasonable to say that Dennet doesn’t think people experience things.
Also, Dennett in particular says that there is no ground truth as to what you experience, and this is arguably a pretty well-defined property that’s in contradiction with the idea that the experience itself exists. Like, I think Camp #2 people will generally hold that, even if errors can come in during the reports of experience, there is still always a precise fact of the matter as to what is being experienced. And depending on their metaphysics, it would be possible to figure out what exactly that is with the right neurotech.
And another reason why I don’t think it’s true is because then I think illusionism wouldn’t matter for ethics, but as I mentioned in the post, there are some illusionists who think their position implies moral nihilism. (There are also people who differentiate illusionism and eliminativism based on this point, but I’m guessing you didn’t mean to do that.)
I beg to differ. The thrust of Dennett’s statement is easily interpreted as the truth of a description being partially constituted by the subject’s acceptance of the description. E.g., in one of the snippets/bits you cite, “I seem to see a pink ring.” If the subject said “I seem to see a reddish oval”, perhaps that would have been true. But compare:
My freely drinking tea rather than coffee is partially constituted by saying to my host “tea, please.” Yet there is still an actual event of my freely drinking tea. Even though if I had said “coffee, please” I probably would have drunk coffee instead.
We are getting into a zone where it is hard to tell what is a verbal issue and what is a substantive one. (And in my view, that’s because the distinction is inherently fuzzy.) But that’s life.