this [that there is no ground truth as to what you experience] is arguably a pretty well-defined property that’s in contradiction with the idea that the experience itself exists.
I beg to differ. The thrust of Dennett’s statement is easily interpreted as the truth of a description being partially constituted by the subject’s acceptance of the description. E.g., in one of the snippets/bits you cite, “I seem to see a pink ring.” If the subject said “I seem to see a reddish oval”, perhaps that would have been true. But compare:
My freely drinking tea rather than coffee is partially constituted by saying to my host “tea, please.” Yet there is still an actual event of my freely drinking tea. Even though if I had said “coffee, please” I probably would have drunk coffee instead.
We are getting into a zone where it is hard to tell what is a verbal issue and what is a substantive one. (And in my view, that’s because the distinction is inherently fuzzy.) But that’s life.
I beg to differ. The thrust of Dennett’s statement is easily interpreted as the truth of a description being partially constituted by the subject’s acceptance of the description. E.g., in one of the snippets/bits you cite, “I seem to see a pink ring.” If the subject said “I seem to see a reddish oval”, perhaps that would have been true. But compare:
My freely drinking tea rather than coffee is partially constituted by saying to my host “tea, please.” Yet there is still an actual event of my freely drinking tea. Even though if I had said “coffee, please” I probably would have drunk coffee instead.
We are getting into a zone where it is hard to tell what is a verbal issue and what is a substantive one. (And in my view, that’s because the distinction is inherently fuzzy.) But that’s life.