Lots of things are non contradictory. Non circularity is more of an achievement.
Such physical definitions of knowledge are not more circular than anything, I think?
So maybe I could arbitrarily assume that definition?
I mean, go ahead—then Mary would just be able to imagine red.
Again, you can’t prove things by adopting definitions.
Exactly—that’s why Mary doesn’t work.
If we had a detailed understanding of neuroscience that predicted an illusion of knowledge-by -acquaintance specifically, you’d be onto something. But illusionist claims are philosophical theories, not scientific facts.
There is no need for additional scientific facts. There are enough scientific facts to accept physical explanation of the whole Mary setup. That’s why people mostly seek philosophical problems with physicalism and why physicalists answer with philosophical theories—if physicalism is philosophically coherent, then it is undoubtedly true.
That would be the case if physicalism is true, but you don’t know that physicalism is.true..You basically assumed it, by assuming that physical explanations are complete. That’s circular.
The Mary’s room was supposed to be an argument against physicalism. If there are no philosophical problems in the setup after you assume physicalism, then argument fails. It is equivalent to disagreeing with some step of an argument, like “Mary gets new knowledge”—you can’t just disallow disagreeing with this because it’s logically equivalent to assuming physicalism—that would be assuming non-physicalism that the argument was about. Of course, I don’t just assume physicalism—you need to satisfy the “no philosophical problems” condition, so I talk about why “Mary gets new knowledge” is just trying to prove things by adopting definitions. I don’t see how do you think it can work otherwise—you can’t derive “physicalism is true” from Mary’s assumptions alone. Obviously, assuming physicalism doesn’t prove that physicalism is true. But again, I don’t argue, that physicalism is true, I’m arguing that Mary is a bad argument.
There is a fact of the matter about whether physical descriptions are exhaustive, even if Mary’s Room doesnt prove it. If physical descriptions don’t convey experiences as such , they are fundamentally flawed , and the precision isn’t much compensation.
Sure. So you do agree now that talking about Mary or knowledge is unnecessary?
They are not ignored, they’re represented by corresponding neural processes. Like, what is ignored and not explained by a physical description?
The experience itself.
So, what is your argument against “experience itself is explained by “human experiences are neural processes”″, if it’s not Mary?
Experience need to be explained because everything needs to be explained. Experiences need not end up in the final ontological model, because sometimes less an explanation explains-away.
If you don’t demand specific experiences to be in the final ontological model, they are explained the same way the fire is explained. The explanation of fire does not usually set you on fire. What you call “I’m seeing blue” is actually “your neurons are activated in a way similar to a way they are activated when blue light is directed to your eyes”. On what basis then you say that these 3gb of numbers from a simulation do not explain fire?
Such physical definitions of knowledge are not more circular than anything, I think?
I don’t know what your mean. I wasn’t intentionally saying anything physical or non physical.
So maybe I could arbitrarily assume that definition?
I mean, go ahead—then Mary would just be able to imagine red.
No,because you can’t prove things through definitions.
Again, you can’t prove things by adopting definitions.
Exactly—that’s why Mary doesn’t work.
The Mary’s Room argument is not an argument from definitions.
If we had a detailed understanding of neuroscience that predicted an illusion of knowledge-by -acquaintance specifically, you’d be onto something. But illusionist claims are philosophical theories, not scientific facts.
There is no need for additional scientific facts. There are enough scientific facts to accept physical explanation of the whole Mary setup.
Show me a prediction of a novel quale!
That’s why people mostly seek philosophical problems with physicalism and why physicalists answer with philosophical theories—if physicalism is philosophically coherent, then it is undoubtedly true.
No. Consistency is necessary for truth, but nowhere near sufficient.
That would be the case if physicalism is true, but you don’t know that physicalism is.true..You basically assumed it, by assuming that physical explanations are complete. That’s circular.
The Mary’s room was supposed to be an argument against physicalism. If there are no philosophical problems in the setup after you assume physicalism,
It’s suppose to be an argumetn against phsysicalism, so you can’t refute it by assuming physicalism.
then argument fails. It is equivalent to disagreeing with some step of an argument, like “Mary gets new knowledge”—you can’t just disallow disagreeing with this
I don’t disallow disagreeing with it. I disallow assuming physicalism. The point is to think about what would happen in the situation whilst suspending judgement about the ontology the world works on.
because it’s logically equivalent to assuming physicalism—that would be assuming non-physicalism that the argument was about.
Non physicalism doesn’t imply “Mary would not know what Red looks like”>
Of course, I don’t just assume physicalism—you need to satisfy the “no philosophical problems” condition, so I talk about why “Mary gets new knowledge” is just trying to prove things by adopting definitions. I don’t see how do you think it can work otherwise—you can’t derive “physicalism is true” from Mary’s assumptions alone. Obviously, assuming physicalism doesn’t prove that physicalism is true. But again, I don’t argue, that physicalism is true, I’m arguing that Mary is a bad argument.
So you do agree now that talking about Mary or knowledge is unnecessary?
No.
They are not ignored, they’re represented by corresponding neural processes.
There’s no fact of the matter about that. If they are fully represented , then Mary would know what red looks like, otherwise not. If we could perform M’s R as a rela experiment, we would not need it as a thought experiment.
Like, what is ignored and not explained by a physical description?
The experience itself.
So, what is your argument against “experience itself is explained by “human experiences are neural processes”″, if it’s not Mary?
There’s no reason it shouldn’t be Mary. Mary’s Room isn’t a proof, but there is no proof of the contrary. Arguments that start “assuming physicalism” are not proof because they are invalid because they are circular.
If you don’t demand specific experiences to be in the final ontological model, they are explained the same way the fire is explained.
We have a detailed gears-level explanation of fire, we do not have one of conscious experience. There are three possibilities, not two:
X is explained, and survives the explanation as part of ontology.
X is explained away.
X is not explained at all.
Merely saying that “X is an emergent, high level phenomenon..but don’t ask me how or why” is not an explanation, despite what many here think.
The explanation of fire does not usually set you on fire.
You only need to instantiate something yourself if it fundamentally subjective.
Physicalists sometimes respond to Mary’s Room by saying that one can not expect Mary actually to actually instantiate Red herself just by looking at a brain scan. It seems obvious to them that a physical description of brain state won’t convey what that state is like, because it doesn’t put you into that state. As an argument for physicalism, the strategy is to accept that qualia exist, but argue that they present no unexpected behaviour, or other difficulties for physicalism.
That is correct as stated but somewhat misleading: the problem is why is it necessary, in the case of experience, and only in the case of experience to instantiate it in order to fully understand it. Obviously, it is true a that a descirption of a brain state won’t put you into that brain state. But that doesn’t show that there is nothing unusual about qualia. The problem is that there in no other case does it seem necessary to instantiate a brain state in order to undertstand something.
If another version of Mary were shut up to learn everything about, say, nuclear fusion, the question “would she actually know about nuclear fusion” could only be answered “yes, of course....didn’t you just say she knows everything”? The idea that she would have to instantiate a fusion reaction within her own body in order to understand fusion is quite counterintuitive. Similarly, a description of photosynthesis will make you photosynthesise, and would not be needed for a complete understanding of photosynthesis.
There seem to be some edge cases.: for instance, would an alternative Mary know everything about heart attacks without having one herself? Well, she would know everything except what a heart attack feels like, and what it feels like is a quale. the edge cases, like that one, are cases are just cases where an element of knowledge-by-acquaintance is needed for complete knowledge. Even other mental phenomena don’t suffer from this peculiarity. Thoughts and memories are straightforwardly expressible in words, so long as they don’t involve qualia.
So: is the response “well, she has never actually instantiated colour vision in her own brain” one that lays to rest and the challenge posed by the Knowledge argument, leaving physicalism undisturbed? The fact that these physicalists feel it would be in some way necessary to instantiate colour, but not other things, like photosynthesis or fusion, means they subscribe to the idea that there is something epistemically unique about qualia/experience, even if they resist the idea that qualia are metaphysically unique.
What you call “I’m seeing blue” is actually “your neurons are activated in a way similar to a way they are activated when blue light is directed to your eyes”.
Says who? You can’t actually show me the explanation, and you can’t prove it by assuming physicalism.
On what basis then you say that these 3gb of numbers from On what basis then you say that these 3gb of numbers from a simulation do not explain fire?
I didn;’t say fire doesn’t have an explanation. Note that explanations have nothing to do with simulations. Explanations have to do with
i) showing that two things are necessarily, not arbitrarily linked.
ii) making predictions, especially novel ones.
An explanation of conscious experience would render zombies unimaginable (because of i) and allow you to predict novel qualia (because of ii).
That is correct as stated but somewhat misleading: the problem is why is it necessary, in the case of experience, and only in the case of experience to instantiate it in order to fully understand it.
Here—“fully understand” depends on definition of “understand”. What you understand is not a matter of fact, it’s a matter of definition. All you talk about is how it is “counterintuitive” to call instantiating nuclear reaction in yourself “understanding”. “It’s intuitive to call new experience “additional knowledge”″ is an argument from definitions.
There seem to be some edge cases.: for instance, would an alternative Mary know everything about heart attacks without having one herself? Well, she would know everything except what a heart attack feels like, and what it feels like is a quale. the edge cases, like that one, are cases are just cases where an element of knowledge-by-acquaintance is needed for complete knowledge. Even other mental phenomena don’t suffer from this peculiarity. Thoughts and memories are straightforwardly expressible in words, so long as they don’t involve qualia.
They are only edge cases of specific definitions of knowledge. There is no fundamental reason why you must call “knowledge” heart attack’s effect on your brain and not call “knowledge” fire’s effect on your hand.
The fact that these physicalists feel it would be in some way necessary to instantiate colour, but not other things, like photosynthesis or fusion, means they subscribe to the idea that there is something epistemically unique about qualia/experience, even if they resist the idea that qualia are metaphysically unique.
“Necessary” for what? Judging from “epistemically unique” it is implied that it is necessary for knowledge? Then it’s certainly incorrect—it’s either not necessary, because Mary can have a more compact representation of knowledge about color, or it’s necessary for all things, if Mary supposed to have all representations of knowledge. It may be necessary for satisfying Mary’s preferences to have qualia independently of their epistemic value—that’s your perfectly physicalist source of subjectivity.
If you only care about matters of fact, then there are no problems for physicalism in that the human qualia are unusual—it predicts that different neural processes are different. And predicts that it’s useful to see things for yourself. And that it will feel intuitive to say “Mary gets new knowledge” for some people. I think it even follows from casual closure, that it doesn’t make sense for there to be unphysical explanation for intuitions? If your intuition is not predicted by physics, then atoms somewhere have to be unexpectedly nudged—is it what you propose? I… don’t really understand the argument here? The physicalism doesn’t say that all things that it is intuitive to call “knowledge” are equally easy to get from books, or something—why exactly it is an argument against physicalism that Mary gets what it predicts?
No,because you can’t prove things through definitions.
There’s no fact of the matter about that. If they are fully represented , then Mary would know what red looks like, otherwise not. If we could perform M’s R as a rela experiment, we would not need it as a thought experiment.
Wait, is the problem that you actually think that it is not obviously physically possible to imagine red without seeing it? Like, knowing everything plausible includes having all permutations of neuron states, including the state where you are seeing red. Is your “matter of fact” about knowing what it is like to see considers the possibility that without actually seeing Mary could only simulate zombie-red or something?
Oh, I finally got why are you talking about predicting novel qualia—you are saying that physicalism doesn’t predict Mary seeing red, right? Because it only predicts neural activity. My point is that this complain doesn’t have anything to do with Mary or knowledge. If you only talk about Mary, then there is no motivation to doubt physicalism from the experiment. The point of Mary is that she gains knowledge and physicalism predicts gaining knowledge. There is no need to talk about novel qualia, because physical knowledge contains knowledge about differences between different, old and novel, qualia. You agree, that physicalism at least (allows definition of knowledge where it) predicts gaining some knowledge from instantiation when Mary leaves room, right? Then even if you have doubts about this predicted knowledge being incomplete, Mary doesn’t provide anything that justifies this doubt—your arguments about insufficient gears-level explanations would work the same way in situations without novel qualia or complete physical knowledge. Or do you have an example of specific difference between qualia that is not predicted by physicalism and uniquely depends on the whole instantiation thing? I mean, my position is that there are no differences between qualia that are not predicted by physicalism at all, so any examples would be appreciated.
Novel relative to what epistemic state? Sure, we probably can’t ethically and consistently make a human say “wow, it was neither sight nor hearing” now, but I really don’t get what’s the justification for ignoring other facts about qualia that physicalism can predict? Some of them were novel for humanity in their time.
Says who?
Induction.
We have a detailed gears-level explanation of fire, we do not have one of conscious experience.
We don’t usually have very detailed explanations of specific fires. And we have detailed explanation of conscious experience—physics equations^^. But ok, there is a space for more useful theories. The thing I don’t understand is how it is an argument against physicalism—do you expect to not get gears-level explanation in the future? The whole point of doing Mary is that no one expects it.
Merely saying that “X is an emergent, high level phenomenon..but don’t ask me how or why” is not an explanation, despite what many here think.
Yes, but that would just mean that the correct position is “physicalism is right, but the detailed explanation is in the works”. Not detailed-enough explanation at the present moment is just one of factors you weight, along with “physicalism has detailed explanations about physics, neurons and all other things”, not something that logically prohibits believing in physicalism. Again, that’s not what mainstream arguments against physicalism are? It’s always “physicalism can’t possibly explain consciousness even if it’s explanation have been detailed”.
i) showing that two things are necessarily, not arbitrarily linked.
That’s what I am against—it’s not justified, depending on what do you mean by “necessarily”—atoms are not necessarily linked to fire. In the end, we just arbitrary call some atoms “fire”. So why demand this only for qualia? If it’s only “as necessary as reduction of fire”, than it is already that necessary—the expectation that you will get neurological explanation in future is the same kind of inductive reasoning that you do, when you decide that correlations between atoms and fire are enough to believe explanation in terms of atoms.
Such physical definitions of knowledge are not more circular than anything, I think?
I mean, go ahead—then Mary would just be able to imagine red.
Exactly—that’s why Mary doesn’t work.
There is no need for additional scientific facts. There are enough scientific facts to accept physical explanation of the whole Mary setup. That’s why people mostly seek philosophical problems with physicalism and why physicalists answer with philosophical theories—if physicalism is philosophically coherent, then it is undoubtedly true.
The Mary’s room was supposed to be an argument against physicalism. If there are no philosophical problems in the setup after you assume physicalism, then argument fails. It is equivalent to disagreeing with some step of an argument, like “Mary gets new knowledge”—you can’t just disallow disagreeing with this because it’s logically equivalent to assuming physicalism—that would be assuming non-physicalism that the argument was about. Of course, I don’t just assume physicalism—you need to satisfy the “no philosophical problems” condition, so I talk about why “Mary gets new knowledge” is just trying to prove things by adopting definitions. I don’t see how do you think it can work otherwise—you can’t derive “physicalism is true” from Mary’s assumptions alone. Obviously, assuming physicalism doesn’t prove that physicalism is true. But again, I don’t argue, that physicalism is true, I’m arguing that Mary is a bad argument.
Sure. So you do agree now that talking about Mary or knowledge is unnecessary?
So, what is your argument against “experience itself is explained by “human experiences are neural processes”″, if it’s not Mary?
If you don’t demand specific experiences to be in the final ontological model, they are explained the same way the fire is explained. The explanation of fire does not usually set you on fire. What you call “I’m seeing blue” is actually “your neurons are activated in a way similar to a way they are activated when blue light is directed to your eyes”. On what basis then you say that these 3gb of numbers from a simulation do not explain fire?
I don’t know what your mean. I wasn’t intentionally saying anything physical or non physical.
No,because you can’t prove things through definitions.
The Mary’s Room argument is not an argument from definitions.
If we had a detailed understanding of neuroscience that predicted an illusion of knowledge-by -acquaintance specifically, you’d be onto something. But illusionist claims are philosophical theories, not scientific facts.
Show me a prediction of a novel quale!
No. Consistency is necessary for truth, but nowhere near sufficient.
That would be the case if physicalism is true, but you don’t know that physicalism is.true..You basically assumed it, by assuming that physical explanations are complete. That’s circular.
It’s suppose to be an argumetn against phsysicalism, so you can’t refute it by assuming physicalism.
I don’t disallow disagreeing with it. I disallow assuming physicalism. The point is to think about what would happen in the situation whilst suspending judgement about the ontology the world works on.
Non physicalism doesn’t imply “Mary would not know what Red looks like”>
No.
There’s no fact of the matter about that. If they are fully represented , then Mary would know what red looks like, otherwise not. If we could perform M’s R as a rela experiment, we would not need it as a thought experiment.
There’s no reason it shouldn’t be Mary. Mary’s Room isn’t a proof, but there is no proof of the contrary. Arguments that start “assuming physicalism” are not proof because they are invalid because they are circular.
We have a detailed gears-level explanation of fire, we do not have one of conscious experience. There are three possibilities, not two:
X is explained, and survives the explanation as part of ontology.
X is explained away.
X is not explained at all.
Merely saying that “X is an emergent, high level phenomenon..but don’t ask me how or why” is not an explanation, despite what many here think.
You only need to instantiate something yourself if it fundamentally subjective.
Physicalists sometimes respond to Mary’s Room by saying that one can not expect Mary actually to actually instantiate Red herself just by looking at a brain scan. It seems obvious to them that a physical description of brain state won’t convey what that state is like, because it doesn’t put you into that state. As an argument for physicalism, the strategy is to accept that qualia exist, but argue that they present no unexpected behaviour, or other difficulties for physicalism.
That is correct as stated but somewhat misleading: the problem is why is it necessary, in the case of experience, and only in the case of experience to instantiate it in order to fully understand it. Obviously, it is true a that a descirption of a brain state won’t put you into that brain state. But that doesn’t show that there is nothing unusual about qualia. The problem is that there in no other case does it seem necessary to instantiate a brain state in order to undertstand something.
If another version of Mary were shut up to learn everything about, say, nuclear fusion, the question “would she actually know about nuclear fusion” could only be answered “yes, of course....didn’t you just say she knows everything”? The idea that she would have to instantiate a fusion reaction within her own body in order to understand fusion is quite counterintuitive. Similarly, a description of photosynthesis will make you photosynthesise, and would not be needed for a complete understanding of photosynthesis.
There seem to be some edge cases.: for instance, would an alternative Mary know everything about heart attacks without having one herself? Well, she would know everything except what a heart attack feels like, and what it feels like is a quale. the edge cases, like that one, are cases are just cases where an element of knowledge-by-acquaintance is needed for complete knowledge. Even other mental phenomena don’t suffer from this peculiarity. Thoughts and memories are straightforwardly expressible in words, so long as they don’t involve qualia.
So: is the response “well, she has never actually instantiated colour vision in her own brain” one that lays to rest and the challenge posed by the Knowledge argument, leaving physicalism undisturbed? The fact that these physicalists feel it would be in some way necessary to instantiate colour, but not other things, like photosynthesis or fusion, means they subscribe to the idea that there is something epistemically unique about qualia/experience, even if they resist the idea that qualia are metaphysically unique.
Says who? You can’t actually show me the explanation, and you can’t prove it by assuming physicalism.
i) showing that two things are necessarily, not arbitrarily linked.
ii) making predictions, especially novel ones.
An explanation of conscious experience would render zombies unimaginable (because of i) and allow you to predict novel qualia (because of ii).
Here—“fully understand” depends on definition of “understand”. What you understand is not a matter of fact, it’s a matter of definition. All you talk about is how it is “counterintuitive” to call instantiating nuclear reaction in yourself “understanding”. “It’s intuitive to call new experience “additional knowledge”″ is an argument from definitions.
They are only edge cases of specific definitions of knowledge. There is no fundamental reason why you must call “knowledge” heart attack’s effect on your brain and not call “knowledge” fire’s effect on your hand.
“Necessary” for what? Judging from “epistemically unique” it is implied that it is necessary for knowledge? Then it’s certainly incorrect—it’s either not necessary, because Mary can have a more compact representation of knowledge about color, or it’s necessary for all things, if Mary supposed to have all representations of knowledge. It may be necessary for satisfying Mary’s preferences to have qualia independently of their epistemic value—that’s your perfectly physicalist source of subjectivity.
If you only care about matters of fact, then there are no problems for physicalism in that the human qualia are unusual—it predicts that different neural processes are different. And predicts that it’s useful to see things for yourself. And that it will feel intuitive to say “Mary gets new knowledge” for some people. I think it even follows from casual closure, that it doesn’t make sense for there to be unphysical explanation for intuitions? If your intuition is not predicted by physics, then atoms somewhere have to be unexpectedly nudged—is it what you propose? I… don’t really understand the argument here? The physicalism doesn’t say that all things that it is intuitive to call “knowledge” are equally easy to get from books, or something—why exactly it is an argument against physicalism that Mary gets what it predicts?
Wait, is the problem that you actually think that it is not obviously physically possible to imagine red without seeing it? Like, knowing everything plausible includes having all permutations of neuron states, including the state where you are seeing red. Is your “matter of fact” about knowing what it is like to see considers the possibility that without actually seeing Mary could only simulate zombie-red or something?
Oh, I finally got why are you talking about predicting novel qualia—you are saying that physicalism doesn’t predict Mary seeing red, right? Because it only predicts neural activity. My point is that this complain doesn’t have anything to do with Mary or knowledge. If you only talk about Mary, then there is no motivation to doubt physicalism from the experiment. The point of Mary is that she gains knowledge and physicalism predicts gaining knowledge. There is no need to talk about novel qualia, because physical knowledge contains knowledge about differences between different, old and novel, qualia. You agree, that physicalism at least (allows definition of knowledge where it) predicts gaining some knowledge from instantiation when Mary leaves room, right? Then even if you have doubts about this predicted knowledge being incomplete, Mary doesn’t provide anything that justifies this doubt—your arguments about insufficient gears-level explanations would work the same way in situations without novel qualia or complete physical knowledge. Or do you have an example of specific difference between qualia that is not predicted by physicalism and uniquely depends on the whole instantiation thing? I mean, my position is that there are no differences between qualia that are not predicted by physicalism at all, so any examples would be appreciated.
I predict, that if you open this link, you will experience red hair: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHPzikH0tXE
Novel relative to what epistemic state? Sure, we probably can’t ethically and consistently make a human say “wow, it was neither sight nor hearing” now, but I really don’t get what’s the justification for ignoring other facts about qualia that physicalism can predict? Some of them were novel for humanity in their time.
Induction.
We don’t usually have very detailed explanations of specific fires. And we have detailed explanation of conscious experience—physics equations^^. But ok, there is a space for more useful theories. The thing I don’t understand is how it is an argument against physicalism—do you expect to not get gears-level explanation in the future? The whole point of doing Mary is that no one expects it.
Yes, but that would just mean that the correct position is “physicalism is right, but the detailed explanation is in the works”. Not detailed-enough explanation at the present moment is just one of factors you weight, along with “physicalism has detailed explanations about physics, neurons and all other things”, not something that logically prohibits believing in physicalism. Again, that’s not what mainstream arguments against physicalism are? It’s always “physicalism can’t possibly explain consciousness even if it’s explanation have been detailed”.
That’s what I am against—it’s not justified, depending on what do you mean by “necessarily”—atoms are not necessarily linked to fire. In the end, we just arbitrary call some atoms “fire”. So why demand this only for qualia? If it’s only “as necessary as reduction of fire”, than it is already that necessary—the expectation that you will get neurological explanation in future is the same kind of inductive reasoning that you do, when you decide that correlations between atoms and fire are enough to believe explanation in terms of atoms.