-Yes, it sure looks like the brain is doing a lot of non-parallel processing that involves several spatially distributed brain areas at once, so
-You mean, it looks from the outside. But I’m not just talking about the computational process, which I am not even aware of as such, I am talking about conscious experience.
-Define qualia
-Look at a sunset. The way it looks is a quale. taste some chocolate,. The way it tastes is a quale.
-Well, I got my experimental subject to look at a sunset and taste some chocolate, and wrote down their reports. What’s that supposed to tell me?
-No, I mean you do it.
-OK, but I don’t see how that proves the existence of non-material experience stuff!
-I didn’t say it does!
-Buy you qualophiles are all the same—you’re all dualists and you all believe in zombies!
-Sigh....!
In other words, the two camps disagree about the epistemic status of apparently perceived experiences: for Camp #2, they’re epistemic bedrock, whereas for Camp #1, they’re model outputs of your brain, and like all model outputs of your brain, they can be wrong.
Both camps are broad. You don’t have to regard qualia as incorrigible to belong in camp #2. You don’t have to believe in zombies, either.
Something that is very important for camp #2, but not mentioned in the OP is the reducibility, of qualia. We don’t have a reductive explanation of qualia, and according to the intended conclusion of the The Mary’s Room thought experiment , we can’t—complete physical knowledge just isn’t enough. The belief in irreducibility is much more of a sine qua non of qualia[philia].
Consciousness Explained gets brought up a lot more than The Conscious Mind
And on top of that, Chalmers views are regularly strawmanned and misrepresented in a way that Dennett’s aren’t.
The belief in irreducibility is much more of a sine qua non of qualiaphobia,
Can you explain that? It seems that plenty of qualiaphiles believe they are irreducible, epistemically if not metaphysically. (But not all: at least some qualiaphiles think qualia are emergent metaphysically. So, I can’t explain what you wrote by supposing you had a simple typo.)
-It’s obvious that conscious experience exists.
-Yes, it sure looks like the brain is doing a lot of non-parallel processing that involves several spatially distributed brain areas at once, so
-You mean, it looks from the outside. But I’m not just talking about the computational process, which I am not even aware of as such, I am talking about conscious experience.
-Define qualia
-Look at a sunset. The way it looks is a quale. taste some chocolate,. The way it tastes is a quale.
-Well, I got my experimental subject to look at a sunset and taste some chocolate, and wrote down their reports. What’s that supposed to tell me?
-No, I mean you do it.
-OK, but I don’t see how that proves the existence of non-material experience stuff!
-I didn’t say it does!
-Buy you qualophiles are all the same—you’re all dualists and you all believe in zombies!
-Sigh....!
Both camps are broad. You don’t have to regard qualia as incorrigible to belong in camp #2. You don’t have to believe in zombies, either.
Something that is very important for camp #2, but not mentioned in the OP is the reducibility, of qualia. We don’t have a reductive explanation of qualia, and according to the intended conclusion of the The Mary’s Room thought experiment , we can’t—complete physical knowledge just isn’t enough. The belief in irreducibility is much more of a sine qua non of qualia[philia].
And on top of that, Chalmers views are regularly strawmanned and misrepresented in a way that Dennett’s aren’t.
Eg.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zombies?commentId=mDcrepyDkhyoZX9JJ
ETA:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zombies?commentId=kZ57nbWk8SennPuzm
And of course,
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zombies?commentId=5qKe5gQ8HWgfRq9Dw
Can you explain that? It seems that plenty of qualiaphiles believe they are irreducible, epistemically if not metaphysically. (But not all: at least some qualiaphiles think qualia are emergent metaphysically. So, I can’t explain what you wrote by supposing you had a simple typo.)
What is misrepresented in the linked comment?
It isn’t an example of misrepresentation: it points out a misrepresentation. As in the first sentence.
Ok, then I don’t get what misinterpretation is not addressed in https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zombies?commentId=chZLkQ8Piu4J5ibC9. Or is it just that the post itself presents Chalmers as believing in epiphenomenalism (which he shouldn’t do), when he actually believes in epiphenomenalism|dualism|monism (which he also shouldn’t do)?