As you say, they shouldn’t, unless it benefits them in some way
I’ve already said that unless someone already desires to be moral, babbling about morality won’t do anything for them. I didn’t say it “shouldn’t” (please stop confusing these two verbs)
But then you also seem to conflate this with a different issue—of what to do with someone who does want to be moral, but understands morality differently than I do.
Which is an utterly different issue. First of all people often have different definitions to describe the same concepts—that’s because quite clearly the human brain doesn’t work with definitions, but with fuzzy categorizations and instinctive “I know it when I see it” which we then attempt to make into definition when we attempt to communicate said concepts to others.
But the very fact we use the same word “morality”, means we identify some common elements of what “morality” means. If we didn’t mean anything similar to each other, we wouldn’t be using the same word to describe it.
I find that supposedly different moralities seem to have some very common elements to them—e.g. people tend to prefer that other people be moral. People generally agree that moral behaviour by everyone leads to happier, healthier societies. They tend to disagree about what that behaviour is, but the effects they describe tend to be common.
I might disagree with Kasparov about what the best next chess move would be, and that doesn’t mean it’s simply a matter of preference—we have a common understanding that the best moves are the ones that lead to an advantageous position. So, though we disagree on the best move, we have an agreement on the results of the best move.
I didn’t say it “shouldn’t” (please stop confusing these two verbs)
What you did say was “of no concern”, and “won’t do anything for them”, which (unless you assume infinite resources) translates to “shouldn’t”. It’s not “conflating”. Let’s stay constructive.
People generally agree that moral behaviour by everyone leads to happier, healthier societies.
Such as in Islamic societies. Wrong fuzzy morality cloud?
But the very fact we use the same word “morality”, means we identify some common elements of what “morality” means. If we didn’t mean anything similar to each other, we wouldn’t be using the same word to describe it.
Sure. What it does not mean, however, is that in between these fuzzily connected concepts is some actual, correct, universal notion of morality. Or would you take some sort of “mean”, which changes with time and social conventions?
If everybody had some vague ideas about games called chess_1 to chess_N, with N being in the millions, that would not translate to some universally correct and acceptable definition of the game of chess. Fuzzy human concepts can’t be assuemd to yield some iron-clad core just beyond our grasp, if only we could blow the fuzziness away. People for the most part agree what to classify as a chair. That doesn’t mean there is some ideal chair we can strive for.
When checking for best moves in pre-defined chess there are definite criteria. There are non-arbitrary metrics to measure “best” by. Kasparov’s proposed chess move can be better than your proposed chess move, using clear and obvious metrics. The analogy doesn’t pan out:
With the fuzzy clouds of what’s “moral”, an outlier could—maybe—say “well, I’m clearly an outlier”, but that wouldn’t necessitate any change, because there is no objective metric to go by. Preferences aren’t subject to Aumann’s, or to a tyranny of the (current societal) majority.
People generally agree that moral behaviour by everyone leads to happier, healthier societies
Such as in Islamic societies. Wrong fuzzy morality cloud?
No, Islamic societies suffer from the delusion that Allah exists. If Allah existed (an omnipotent creature that punishes you horribly if you fail to obey Quran’s commandments), then Islamic societies would have the right idea.
Remove their false belief in Allah, and I fail to see any great moral difference between our society and Islamic ones.
I’ve already said that unless someone already desires to be moral, babbling about morality won’t do anything for them. I didn’t say it “shouldn’t” (please stop confusing these two verbs)
But then you also seem to conflate this with a different issue—of what to do with someone who does want to be moral, but understands morality differently than I do.
Which is an utterly different issue. First of all people often have different definitions to describe the same concepts—that’s because quite clearly the human brain doesn’t work with definitions, but with fuzzy categorizations and instinctive “I know it when I see it” which we then attempt to make into definition when we attempt to communicate said concepts to others.
But the very fact we use the same word “morality”, means we identify some common elements of what “morality” means. If we didn’t mean anything similar to each other, we wouldn’t be using the same word to describe it.
I find that supposedly different moralities seem to have some very common elements to them—e.g. people tend to prefer that other people be moral. People generally agree that moral behaviour by everyone leads to happier, healthier societies. They tend to disagree about what that behaviour is, but the effects they describe tend to be common.
I might disagree with Kasparov about what the best next chess move would be, and that doesn’t mean it’s simply a matter of preference—we have a common understanding that the best moves are the ones that lead to an advantageous position. So, though we disagree on the best move, we have an agreement on the results of the best move.
What you did say was “of no concern”, and “won’t do anything for them”, which (unless you assume infinite resources) translates to “shouldn’t”. It’s not “conflating”. Let’s stay constructive.
Such as in Islamic societies. Wrong fuzzy morality cloud?
Sure. What it does not mean, however, is that in between these fuzzily connected concepts is some actual, correct, universal notion of morality. Or would you take some sort of “mean”, which changes with time and social conventions?
If everybody had some vague ideas about games called chess_1 to chess_N, with N being in the millions, that would not translate to some universally correct and acceptable definition of the game of chess. Fuzzy human concepts can’t be assuemd to yield some iron-clad core just beyond our grasp, if only we could blow the fuzziness away. People for the most part agree what to classify as a chair. That doesn’t mean there is some ideal chair we can strive for.
When checking for best moves in pre-defined chess there are definite criteria. There are non-arbitrary metrics to measure “best” by. Kasparov’s proposed chess move can be better than your proposed chess move, using clear and obvious metrics. The analogy doesn’t pan out:
With the fuzzy clouds of what’s “moral”, an outlier could—maybe—say “well, I’m clearly an outlier”, but that wouldn’t necessitate any change, because there is no objective metric to go by. Preferences aren’t subject to Aumann’s, or to a tyranny of the (current societal) majority.
No, Islamic societies suffer from the delusion that Allah exists. If Allah existed (an omnipotent creature that punishes you horribly if you fail to obey Quran’s commandments), then Islamic societies would have the right idea.
Remove their false belief in Allah, and I fail to see any great moral difference between our society and Islamic ones.