Simple things can contain more complex things. The reason the more complex thing can be more complex is that it takes extra bits to specify what part of the simple thing to look at.
What I mean though, is that the more complicated universes can’t be less significant, because they are contained within this simple universe. All universes would have to be at least as morally significant as this universe, would they not?
I’m not following you here. I think Raiden has a valid point: we should shape the utility function so that Boltzmann brains don’t dominate utility computations. The meta-framework for utility you constructed remains perfectly valid, it’s just that the “local” utility of each universe has to be constructed with care (which is true about other meta-frameworks as well). E.g. we shouldn’t assigned a utility of Graham’s number of utilons to a universe just because it contains a Graham’s number of Boltzmann brains: it’s Pascal mugging.
Maybe we should start with a bounded utility function...
I am not sure if Raiden’s intended point is the same as what you are saying here. If it is, then you can just ignore my other comment, it was arguing with a position nobody held.
I absolutely agree. The local utility of each universe does have to be constructed with care.
I also have strong feelings that all utility functions are bounded.
I was imagining one utility function for the multiverse, but perhaps that does not make sense. (since the collection of universes might not be a set)
Perhaps the best way to model the utility function in my philosophy might be to have a separate utility function for each universe, and a simplicity exchange rate between them.
Simple things can contain more complex things. The reason the more complex thing can be more complex is that it takes extra bits to specify what part of the simple thing to look at.
What I mean though, is that the more complicated universes can’t be less significant, because they are contained within this simple universe. All universes would have to be at least as morally significant as this universe, would they not?
If I have have a world containing many people, I can say that the world is more morally significant than any of the individual people.
I’m not following you here. I think Raiden has a valid point: we should shape the utility function so that Boltzmann brains don’t dominate utility computations. The meta-framework for utility you constructed remains perfectly valid, it’s just that the “local” utility of each universe has to be constructed with care (which is true about other meta-frameworks as well). E.g. we shouldn’t assigned a utility of Graham’s number of utilons to a universe just because it contains a Graham’s number of Boltzmann brains: it’s Pascal mugging.
Maybe we should start with a bounded utility function...
I am not sure if Raiden’s intended point is the same as what you are saying here. If it is, then you can just ignore my other comment, it was arguing with a position nobody held.
I absolutely agree. The local utility of each universe does have to be constructed with care.
I also have strong feelings that all utility functions are bounded.
I was imagining one utility function for the multiverse, but perhaps that does not make sense. (since the collection of universes might not be a set)
Perhaps the best way to model the utility function in my philosophy might be to have a separate utility function for each universe, and a simplicity exchange rate between them.