My main point was not that I care about non-existing things in any way that conflicts with cares about existing things. My point was that believing in the concept of existence is not necessary for having preferences. I suppose I would agree with
A: Hmm, I guess I want [happiness of non-existing agents] too. However, that is negligible compared to my preferences about things that really do exist.
If not for the fact that I don’t think existence has any meaning.
No. Because you explored the extremes of empathy toward beings.
You don’t follow a path going from less to more extreme as I outlined but an extreme in different aspects you explore nonetheless.
Oh, ok, I get the connection now, thanks.
My main point was not that I care about non-existing things in any way that conflicts with cares about existing things. My point was that believing in the concept of existence is not necessary for having preferences. I suppose I would agree with
If not for the fact that I don’t think existence has any meaning.