I replied as follows: “What would you think of someone who said, “I would like to have a cat, provided it barked”? [...] As a natural scientist, you recognize that you cannot assign characteristics at will to chemical and biological entities, cannot demand that cats bark or water burn. Why do you suppose that the situation is different in the “social sciences?”
There are valid quibbles and exceptions on both counts. Some breeds of cats make vocalizations that can reasonably be described as “barking”, and water will burn if there are sufficient concentrations of either an oxidizer much stronger than oxygen (such as chlorine triflouride) or a reducing agent much stronger than hydrogen (such as elemental sodium).
In the general case, though, water will not burn under normal circumstances, and most cats are physiologically incapable of barking.
The point of the quote is that objects and systems do have innate qualities that shape and limit their behaviour, and that this effect is present in social systems studied by economists as well as in physical systems studied by chemists and biologists. In the original context (which I elided because politics is the mind killer, and because any particular application of the principle is subject to empirical debate as to its validity), Friedman was following up on an article about how political economy considerations incline regulatory agencies towards socially suboptimal decisions, addressing responses that assumed that the political economy pressures could easily be designed away by revising the agencies’ structures.
I was actually thinking in terms of ‘cats can deliberately meow in an annoying fashion (abstract) like human infants and this behaviors seems perfectly modifiable, so a transhumanist could have a decent reason for preferring cats to bark than meow; and this is really stupid anyway, since we can change cats easily—we certainly can demand cats bark—but we can’t change physis easily and can’t demand water burn’.
The preference alone is mostly harmless. When the preference is combined with the misapprehension that the preference can be fulfilled, it may harm the person asserting the preference if it leads them to make a bad choice between a meowing cat, a barking dog, or delaying the purchase of a pet.
If the preference order were (1. Barking Cat, 2. Barking Dog, 3. Meowing Cat, 4. No Pet), then the belief that a cat could be taught to bark could lead to the purchase/adoption of a meowing cat instead of the (preferred) barking dog.
Likewise, in the above preference order, or with 2 and 3 reversed, the belief in barking cats could also lead to the person delaying the selection of a pet due to the hope that a continued search would turn up a barking cat.
The problem is magnified, and more failure modes added, when we consider cases of group decision-making.
“I would like to have a cat, provided it barked” states that U(barking cat) > U(no cat) > U(nonbarking* cat). Preferring a meowing cat to no cat is a contradiction of what was stated. The issue you raise can still be seen with U(barking cat) > U(barking dog) > U(no pet) > U(nonbarking cat), however—a belief in the attainability of the barking cat may cause someone to delay the purchase of a barking dog that would make them happier.
*In common usage, I expect that we should restrict it from “any nonbarking cat” to “ordinary cat”, based on totally subjective intuitions. I would not be surprised by someone who said “I would like an X, provided it Y” for a seemingly unattainable Y, and would not have considered whether they would want an X that Z for some other seemingly unattainable Z. I think they just would have compared the unusual specimen to the typical specimen and concluded they want the former and don’t want the latter. This is mostly immaterial here, I think.
If the preference order were (1. Barking Cat, 2. Barking Dog, 3. Meowing Cat, 4. No Pet)
That’s strictly ruled out by the wording in the quote. While people often miscommunicate their preferences, I don’t see particular evidence of it there, or even that the hypothetical person is under a misapprehension.
To take it back to metaphor: the flip side of wishful thinking is the sour grapes fallacy, and while the quote doesn’t explicitly commit it, without context it’s close enough to put me moderately on guard.
-- Milton Friedman
One of these things is not like the others, one of these things does not belong.
There are valid quibbles and exceptions on both counts. Some breeds of cats make vocalizations that can reasonably be described as “barking”, and water will burn if there are sufficient concentrations of either an oxidizer much stronger than oxygen (such as chlorine triflouride) or a reducing agent much stronger than hydrogen (such as elemental sodium).
In the general case, though, water will not burn under normal circumstances, and most cats are physiologically incapable of barking.
The point of the quote is that objects and systems do have innate qualities that shape and limit their behaviour, and that this effect is present in social systems studied by economists as well as in physical systems studied by chemists and biologists. In the original context (which I elided because politics is the mind killer, and because any particular application of the principle is subject to empirical debate as to its validity), Friedman was following up on an article about how political economy considerations incline regulatory agencies towards socially suboptimal decisions, addressing responses that assumed that the political economy pressures could easily be designed away by revising the agencies’ structures.
Relevant.
I was actually thinking in terms of ‘cats can deliberately meow in an annoying fashion (abstract) like human infants and this behaviors seems perfectly modifiable, so a transhumanist could have a decent reason for preferring cats to bark than meow; and this is really stupid anyway, since we can change cats easily—we certainly can demand cats bark—but we can’t change physis easily and can’t demand water burn’.
pfsch. You can burn water if you add salt and radio waves. Or if you put it in an atmosphere containing a reactive fluorine compound. Etc etc etc.
That since their preference harms nobody (apart from unadopted cats) and the utility function is not up for grabs, I have no grounds to criticize them?
The preference alone is mostly harmless. When the preference is combined with the misapprehension that the preference can be fulfilled, it may harm the person asserting the preference if it leads them to make a bad choice between a meowing cat, a barking dog, or delaying the purchase of a pet.
If the preference order were (1. Barking Cat, 2. Barking Dog, 3. Meowing Cat, 4. No Pet), then the belief that a cat could be taught to bark could lead to the purchase/adoption of a meowing cat instead of the (preferred) barking dog.
Likewise, in the above preference order, or with 2 and 3 reversed, the belief in barking cats could also lead to the person delaying the selection of a pet due to the hope that a continued search would turn up a barking cat.
The problem is magnified, and more failure modes added, when we consider cases of group decision-making.
“I would like to have a cat, provided it barked” states that U(barking cat) > U(no cat) > U(nonbarking* cat). Preferring a meowing cat to no cat is a contradiction of what was stated. The issue you raise can still be seen with U(barking cat) > U(barking dog) > U(no pet) > U(nonbarking cat), however—a belief in the attainability of the barking cat may cause someone to delay the purchase of a barking dog that would make them happier.
*In common usage, I expect that we should restrict it from “any nonbarking cat” to “ordinary cat”, based on totally subjective intuitions. I would not be surprised by someone who said “I would like an X, provided it Y” for a seemingly unattainable Y, and would not have considered whether they would want an X that Z for some other seemingly unattainable Z. I think they just would have compared the unusual specimen to the typical specimen and concluded they want the former and don’t want the latter. This is mostly immaterial here, I think.
I stand corrected.
That’s strictly ruled out by the wording in the quote. While people often miscommunicate their preferences, I don’t see particular evidence of it there, or even that the hypothetical person is under a misapprehension.
To take it back to metaphor: the flip side of wishful thinking is the sour grapes fallacy, and while the quote doesn’t explicitly commit it, without context it’s close enough to put me moderately on guard.
Here is the full article from which the quote was taken: http://www.johnlatour.com/barking_cats.htm