And although I’m using the multiple selves / sub-agents terminology, I think it’s really just a rhetorical device. There are not multiple selves in any real sense.
I would actually dispute this, but that goes into what you actually mean by a “self”. I don’t see how it’s not obvious that are multiple agents at work; the problem of akrasia is, then, trying to decide which agent actually gets to pilot your brain at that instant. I suspect this is alleviated, to some extent, by increased self-awareness; if you can pick out modes of thought that you don’t actually want to “endorse” (like the “I want to be a physicist” versus “I don’t want to do physics” example below), you are probably more likely to have the ability to override what you label as “not endorsed” than if you are actually sitting there wondering “wait, is this what I really think? Which mode is me?”
I agree that knowing which is the real me is the first step, and I propose that it has a simple answer: the me not under the influence of immediate consequences. So then the next question is how to make sure that me’s decisions are the ones that stick.
If we agree on that much then I suppose the question of whether “multiple selves” are real vs a rhetorical device is moot.
knowing which is the real me is the first step, and I propose that it has a simple answer: the me not under the influence of immediate consequences.
We don’t agree on that much, actually.
I don’t want to get into a whole digression on the concept of “the real me,” so hopefully it will suffice to say that insofar as I choose to identify preferentially with any subset of my psyche I prefer to identify with the sustainably joyful subset, and I have often had the influence of immediate consequences evoking a more sustainably joyful frame than the working model of long-term consequences it displaces.
Conversely, if we insist on having the “real me” discussion, I propose that the real me is the entire network of mutually activating and inhibiting systems in my head. Making progress towards goals and experiencing akrasia are both manifestations of the real me.
That said, I don’t think it matters in the local context. We can ignore the whole question of “which me” and “real me” and “multiple mes” and still address how to best strengthen the mental substructures that make progress towards goals and don’t succumb to akrasia.
Agreed! (Not sure why you say we don’t agree on that much.)
So you want to satisfy your joyful frame or however you want to put it, like eating yummy pie and whatnot. That’s fine, but notice how you can appreciate the value of that now, while writing this LessWrong comment. So what’s the problem with letting current-you call the shots? You don’t seem to be in danger of undervaluing joy.
The degree to which I seem to value joy (judging from my behavior) varies a lot, depending on what else is going on. The degree to which I am doing so now, while writing this LessWrong comment, doesn’t seem to be the peak of that curve.
I would actually dispute this, but that goes into what you actually mean by a “self”. I don’t see how it’s not obvious that are multiple agents at work; the problem of akrasia is, then, trying to decide which agent actually gets to pilot your brain at that instant. I suspect this is alleviated, to some extent, by increased self-awareness; if you can pick out modes of thought that you don’t actually want to “endorse” (like the “I want to be a physicist” versus “I don’t want to do physics” example below), you are probably more likely to have the ability to override what you label as “not endorsed” than if you are actually sitting there wondering “wait, is this what I really think? Which mode is me?”
I agree that knowing which is the real me is the first step, and I propose that it has a simple answer: the me not under the influence of immediate consequences. So then the next question is how to make sure that me’s decisions are the ones that stick.
If we agree on that much then I suppose the question of whether “multiple selves” are real vs a rhetorical device is moot.
We don’t agree on that much, actually.
I don’t want to get into a whole digression on the concept of “the real me,” so hopefully it will suffice to say that insofar as I choose to identify preferentially with any subset of my psyche I prefer to identify with the sustainably joyful subset, and I have often had the influence of immediate consequences evoking a more sustainably joyful frame than the working model of long-term consequences it displaces.
Conversely, if we insist on having the “real me” discussion, I propose that the real me is the entire network of mutually activating and inhibiting systems in my head. Making progress towards goals and experiencing akrasia are both manifestations of the real me.
That said, I don’t think it matters in the local context. We can ignore the whole question of “which me” and “real me” and “multiple mes” and still address how to best strengthen the mental substructures that make progress towards goals and don’t succumb to akrasia.
Agreed! (Not sure why you say we don’t agree on that much.)
So you want to satisfy your joyful frame or however you want to put it, like eating yummy pie and whatnot. That’s fine, but notice how you can appreciate the value of that now, while writing this LessWrong comment. So what’s the problem with letting current-you call the shots? You don’t seem to be in danger of undervaluing joy.
The degree to which I seem to value joy (judging from my behavior) varies a lot, depending on what else is going on. The degree to which I am doing so now, while writing this LessWrong comment, doesn’t seem to be the peak of that curve.