There are a lot of different types of question, and probabilities don’t seem to mean the same thing across them.
There are definitely a lot of different types of questions. There are also definitely multiple interpretation of probability. (This post presumes a Bayesian/subjectivist interpretation of probability, but a major contender is the frequentist view.) And it’s definitely possible that there are some types of questions where it’s more common, empirically speaking, to use one interpretation of probability than another, and possibly where that’s more useful too. But I’m not aware of it being the case that probabilities just have to mean a different thing for different types of questions. If that’s roughly what you meant, could you expand on that? (That might go to the heart of the claim I’m exploring the defensibility of in this post, as I guess I’m basically arguing that we could always assign at least slightly meaningful subjective credences to any given claim.)
If instead you meant just that “a 0.001% chance of god being real” could mean either “a 0.001% chance of precisely the Judeo-Christian God being real, in very much the way that religion would expect” or “a 0.001% chance that any sort of supernatural force at all is real, even in a way no human has ever imagined at all”, and that those are very different claims, then I agree.
There are definitely a lot of different types of questions. There are also definitely multiple interpretation of probability. (This post presumes a Bayesian/subjectivist interpretation of probability, but a major contender is the frequentist view.) And it’s definitely possible that there are some types of questions where it’s more common, empirically speaking, to use one interpretation of probability than another, and possibly where that’s more useful too. But I’m not aware of it being the case that probabilities just have to mean a different thing for different types of questions. If that’s roughly what you meant, could you expand on that? (That might go to the heart of the claim I’m exploring the defensibility of in this post, as I guess I’m basically arguing that we could always assign at least slightly meaningful subjective credences to any given claim.)
If instead you meant just that “a 0.001% chance of god being real” could mean either “a 0.001% chance of precisely the Judeo-Christian God being real, in very much the way that religion would expect” or “a 0.001% chance that any sort of supernatural force at all is real, even in a way no human has ever imagined at all”, and that those are very different claims, then I agree.