Either I’ve misunderstood the OP completely, or the prior is based on an explicit assumption of finite resources—an assumption which would ordinarily have a probability far less than 1 - (1/3^^^^3), though in everyday circumstances we can pretty much call it ‘certainty’. So no, the counterargument is absolutely valid.
Also, as you should know if you read the Muggle post, Eliezer most certainly did mean Pascal’s Mugging to draw attention to the failure of expected utility to converge. So you should be clearer at the start about what you think your argument does. What you have now almost seems like a quick disclaimer added when you realized the OP had failed.
Sorry, but I don’t know which section of my reply this is addressing and I can’t make complete sense of it.
an explicit assumption of finite resources—an assumption which would ordinarily have a probability far less than 1 - (1/3^^^^3)
The OP is broken into two main sections, one assuming finite resources and one assuming infinite.
Our universe has finite resources, why would an assumption of finite resources in an alternative universe be vanishingly unlikely? Personally I would expect finite resources with probability ~=1. I’m not including time as a “resource” here by the way, because infinite future time can be dealt with by geometric discounting and so isn’t interesting.
What you have now almost seems like a quick disclaimer added when you realized the OP had failed.
It would especially help to know which quote you are referring to here.
Overall I endeavoured to show that the mugging fails in the finite case, and is nothing particularly special in the infinite case. The mugging as I see it is intended as a demonstration that large, low complexity numbers are a problem. I argue that infinite resources are a problem, but large, low complexity numbers on their own are not.
I still don’t consider my arguments to have failed (though it’s becoming clear that at least my presentation of them has since no-one seems to have appreciated it), I do disclaim that the mugging still raises the question of infinite resources, but reducing it to just that issue is not a failure.
I also remain firmly convinced that expected utilities (both personal and moral) can and should converge, it’s just that the correct means of dealing with infinity needs to be applied, and I leave a few options open in that regard.
Either I’ve misunderstood the OP completely, or the prior is based on an explicit assumption of finite resources—an assumption which would ordinarily have a probability far less than 1 - (1/3^^^^3), though in everyday circumstances we can pretty much call it ‘certainty’. So no, the counterargument is absolutely valid.
Also, as you should know if you read the Muggle post, Eliezer most certainly did mean Pascal’s Mugging to draw attention to the failure of expected utility to converge. So you should be clearer at the start about what you think your argument does. What you have now almost seems like a quick disclaimer added when you realized the OP had failed.
(Edited to fix typo.)
Sorry, but I don’t know which section of my reply this is addressing and I can’t make complete sense of it.
The OP is broken into two main sections, one assuming finite resources and one assuming infinite.
Our universe has finite resources, why would an assumption of finite resources in an alternative universe be vanishingly unlikely? Personally I would expect finite resources with probability ~=1. I’m not including time as a “resource” here by the way, because infinite future time can be dealt with by geometric discounting and so isn’t interesting.
It would especially help to know which quote you are referring to here.
Overall I endeavoured to show that the mugging fails in the finite case, and is nothing particularly special in the infinite case. The mugging as I see it is intended as a demonstration that large, low complexity numbers are a problem. I argue that infinite resources are a problem, but large, low complexity numbers on their own are not.
I still don’t consider my arguments to have failed (though it’s becoming clear that at least my presentation of them has since no-one seems to have appreciated it), I do disclaim that the mugging still raises the question of infinite resources, but reducing it to just that issue is not a failure.
I also remain firmly convinced that expected utilities (both personal and moral) can and should converge, it’s just that the correct means of dealing with infinity needs to be applied, and I leave a few options open in that regard.