e.g. Eliezer would put way less than 10% on fish feeling pain in a morally relevant way
Semi-tangent: setting aside the ‘morally relevant way’ part, has Eliezer ever actually made the case for his beliefs about (the absence of) qualia in various animals? The impression I’ve got is that he expresses quite high confidence, but sadly the margin is always too narrow to contain the proof.
I don’t know any place where he wrote it up properly, but he’s said enough to infer that he’s confident that consciousness is about higher-order thoughts (i.e., self-reflection/meta-awareness/etc.) This explains the confidence that chickens aren’t conscious, and it would extend to fish as well.
Semi-tangent: setting aside the ‘morally relevant way’ part, has Eliezer ever actually made the case for his beliefs about (the absence of) qualia in various animals? The impression I’ve got is that he expresses quite high confidence, but sadly the margin is always too narrow to contain the proof.
I don’t know any place where he wrote it up properly, but he’s said enough to infer that he’s confident that consciousness is about higher-order thoughts (i.e., self-reflection/meta-awareness/etc.) This explains the confidence that chickens aren’t conscious, and it would extend to fish as well.