ETA: more analysis here, using the general undergrad vs target faculty comparison, instead of comparing grad students and faculty within an AOS.
This should be taken very seriously. In the case of philosophy of religion I think what’s happening is a selection effect: people who believe in theist religion are disproportionately likely to think it worthwhile to study philosophy of religion, i.e. the theism predates their expertise in the philosophy of religion, and isn’t a result of it. Similarly moral anti-realists are going to be less interested in in meta-ethics, and in general people who think a field is pointless or nonsense won’t go into it.
Now, I am going to try to test that for religion, meta-ethics, and decision theory by comparing graduate students with a specialty in the field to target (elite) faculty with specialties in the field in the PhilPapers data, available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl . It looks like target faculty philosophers of religion and meta-ethicists are actually less theistic and less moral realist than graduate students specializing in those areas, suggesting that selection effects rather than learning explain the views of these specialists. There weren’t enough data points for decision theory to draw conclusions. I haven’t tried any other analyses or looked at other subjects yet, or otherwise applied a publication bias filter.
Graduate students with philosophy of religion as an Area of Specialization (AOS):
God: theism or atheism?
Accept: theism 29 / 43 (67.4%)
Lean toward: theism 4 / 43 (9.3%)
Lean toward: atheism 3 / 43 (7.0%)
Accept: atheism 2 / 43 (4.7%)
Agnostic/undecided 1 / 43 (2.3%)
There is no fact of the matter 1 / 43 (2.3%)
Accept another alternative 1 / 43 (2.3%)
Accept an intermediate view 1 / 43 (2.3%)
Reject both 1 / 43 (2.3%)
Target faculty with philosophy of religion as AOS:
Accept: moral realism 50 / 116 (43.1%)
Lean toward: moral realism 25 / 116 (21.6%)
Accept: moral anti-realism 19 / 116 (16.4%)
Lean toward: moral anti-realism 9 / 116 (7.8%)
Agnostic/undecided 4 / 116 (3.4%)
Accept an intermediate view 4 / 116 (3.4%)
Accept another alternative 3 / 116 (2.6%)
Reject both 2 / 116 (1.7%)
Target faculty with a meta-ethics AOS:
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Accept: moral realism 42 / 102 (41.2%)
Accept: moral anti-realism 17 / 102 (16.7%)
Lean toward: moral realism 15 / 102 (14.7%)
Lean toward: moral anti-realism 10 / 102 (9.8%)
Accept an intermediate view 7 / 102 (6.9%)
The question is too unclear to answer 6 / 102 (5.9%)
Accept another alternative 3 / 102 (2.9%)
Agnostic/undecided 2 / 102 (2.0%)
Graduate students in decision theory:
Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes?
Accept: two boxes 3 / 9 (33.3%)
Accept another alternative 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Accept an intermediate view 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Lean toward: one box 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Accept: one box 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Insufficiently familiar with the issue 1 / 9 (11.1%)
The question is too unclear to answer 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Target faculty in decision theory:
Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes?
Accept: two boxes 13 / 31 (41.9%)
Accept: one box 7 / 31 (22.6%)
Lean toward: two boxes 6 / 31 (19.4%)
Other 2 / 31 (6.5%)
Agnostic/undecided 2 / 31 (6.5%)
Lean toward: one box 1 / 31 (3.2%)
In the case of philosophy of religion I think what’s happening is a selection effect: people who believe in theist religion are disproportionately likely to think it worthwhile to study philosophy of religion, i.e. the theism predates their expertise in the philosophy of religion, and isn’t a result of it.
I’ll give you a slightly different spin on the bias. More evolutionary bias than selection bias.
People who assert that a field is worthwhile are more likely to be successful in that field.
ETA: more analysis here, using the general undergrad vs target faculty comparison, instead of comparing grad students and faculty within an AOS.
This should be taken very seriously. In the case of philosophy of religion I think what’s happening is a selection effect: people who believe in theist religion are disproportionately likely to think it worthwhile to study philosophy of religion, i.e. the theism predates their expertise in the philosophy of religion, and isn’t a result of it. Similarly moral anti-realists are going to be less interested in in meta-ethics, and in general people who think a field is pointless or nonsense won’t go into it.
Now, I am going to try to test that for religion, meta-ethics, and decision theory by comparing graduate students with a specialty in the field to target (elite) faculty with specialties in the field in the PhilPapers data, available at http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl . It looks like target faculty philosophers of religion and meta-ethicists are actually less theistic and less moral realist than graduate students specializing in those areas, suggesting that selection effects rather than learning explain the views of these specialists. There weren’t enough data points for decision theory to draw conclusions. I haven’t tried any other analyses or looked at other subjects yet, or otherwise applied a publication bias filter.
Graduate students with philosophy of religion as an Area of Specialization (AOS):
God: theism or atheism?
Accept: theism 29 / 43 (67.4%) Lean toward: theism 4 / 43 (9.3%) Lean toward: atheism 3 / 43 (7.0%) Accept: atheism 2 / 43 (4.7%) Agnostic/undecided 1 / 43 (2.3%) There is no fact of the matter 1 / 43 (2.3%) Accept another alternative 1 / 43 (2.3%) Accept an intermediate view 1 / 43 (2.3%) Reject both 1 / 43 (2.3%)
Target faculty with philosophy of religion as AOS:
God: theism or atheism?
Accept: theism 30 / 47 (63.8%) Accept: atheism 9 / 47 (19.1%) Lean toward: theism 4 / 47 (8.5%) Reject both 2 / 47 (4.3%) Agnostic/undecided 2 / 47 (4.3%)
Graduate students with a metaethics AOS:
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Accept: moral realism 50 / 116 (43.1%) Lean toward: moral realism 25 / 116 (21.6%) Accept: moral anti-realism 19 / 116 (16.4%) Lean toward: moral anti-realism 9 / 116 (7.8%) Agnostic/undecided 4 / 116 (3.4%) Accept an intermediate view 4 / 116 (3.4%) Accept another alternative 3 / 116 (2.6%) Reject both 2 / 116 (1.7%)
Target faculty with a meta-ethics AOS:
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?
Accept: moral realism 42 / 102 (41.2%) Accept: moral anti-realism 17 / 102 (16.7%) Lean toward: moral realism 15 / 102 (14.7%) Lean toward: moral anti-realism 10 / 102 (9.8%) Accept an intermediate view 7 / 102 (6.9%) The question is too unclear to answer 6 / 102 (5.9%) Accept another alternative 3 / 102 (2.9%) Agnostic/undecided 2 / 102 (2.0%)
Graduate students in decision theory:
Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes?
Accept: two boxes 3 / 9 (33.3%) Accept another alternative 1 / 9 (11.1%) Accept an intermediate view 1 / 9 (11.1%) Lean toward: one box 1 / 9 (11.1%) Accept: one box 1 / 9 (11.1%) Insufficiently familiar with the issue 1 / 9 (11.1%) The question is too unclear to answer 1 / 9 (11.1%)
Target faculty in decision theory:
Newcomb’s problem: one box or two boxes?
Accept: two boxes 13 / 31 (41.9%) Accept: one box 7 / 31 (22.6%) Lean toward: two boxes 6 / 31 (19.4%) Other 2 / 31 (6.5%) Agnostic/undecided 2 / 31 (6.5%) Lean toward: one box 1 / 31 (3.2%)
I’ll give you a slightly different spin on the bias. More evolutionary bias than selection bias.
People who assert that a field is worthwhile are more likely to be successful in that field.