Where does the question assume that you can compute the optimal result? Newcomb’s Problem simply poses a hypothetical and asks ‘What would you do?‘. Some people think they’ve gotten the right answer; others are less confident. But no answer should need to presuppose at the outset that we can arrive at the very best answer no matter what; if it did, that would show the impossibility of getting the right answer, not the trustworthiness of the ‘I can optimally answer this question’ postulate.
I once had a man walk up to me and ask me if I had the correct time. I looked at my watch and told him the time. But it seemed a little odd that he asked for the correct time. Did he think that if he didn’t specify the qualifier “correct”, I might be uncertain whether I should give him the correct or incorrect time?
I think that asking what you would do, in the context of a reasoning problem, carries the implication “figure out the correct choice” even if you are not being explicitly asked what is correct. Besides, the problem is seldom worded exactly the same way each time and some formulations of it do ask for the correct answer.
For the record, I would one-box, but I don’t actually think that finding the correct answer requires simulating Omega. But I can think of variations of the problem where finding the correct answer does require being able to simulate Omega (or worse yet, produces a self-reference paradox without anyone having to simulate Omega.)
Where does the question assume that you can compute the optimal result? Newcomb’s Problem simply poses a hypothetical and asks ‘What would you do?‘. Some people think they’ve gotten the right answer; others are less confident. But no answer should need to presuppose at the outset that we can arrive at the very best answer no matter what; if it did, that would show the impossibility of getting the right answer, not the trustworthiness of the ‘I can optimally answer this question’ postulate.
I once had a man walk up to me and ask me if I had the correct time. I looked at my watch and told him the time. But it seemed a little odd that he asked for the correct time. Did he think that if he didn’t specify the qualifier “correct”, I might be uncertain whether I should give him the correct or incorrect time?
I think that asking what you would do, in the context of a reasoning problem, carries the implication “figure out the correct choice” even if you are not being explicitly asked what is correct. Besides, the problem is seldom worded exactly the same way each time and some formulations of it do ask for the correct answer.
For the record, I would one-box, but I don’t actually think that finding the correct answer requires simulating Omega. But I can think of variations of the problem where finding the correct answer does require being able to simulate Omega (or worse yet, produces a self-reference paradox without anyone having to simulate Omega.)