There’s that word again. I’m not reifying numbers. Abstract objects aren’t “things”. They aren’t concrete. Platonists don’t want to reify centers of gravity or numbers
There has to be some content to Platonism. You seem to be assuming that by “reifying” I must mean “treat as concretely existent”. In context, what I mean is “treat as being existent in whatever sense Platonists think abstracta are existent”. I am not sure what that is, but there has to be something to it, or there is no content
to Platonism, and in any case it is not my job to explain it.
Platonism and nominalism don’t differ in anticipations of future sensory experiences. The difference is entirely about theory and methodology.
I am not sure what you mean by that. The difference is about ontology. If two theories make the same predictions, and one of them has more entities, one of them is multiplying entities unnecessarily.
I’ve already replied to the Occam’s razor thing: our theories that include abstract objects are radically simpler and easier to use than the attempts that do not exclude abstract objects.
And I have replied to the reply. The Quinean approach incorrectly takes a scientific theory to be a formalism.
It is only methodologicaly simpler to reify whatever is quantified over, formally, but that approach is too simple
because it leaves out the semantics of physics—it doensn’t distinguish between f=ma and p=qr.
I’m not sure they have a location in the same way that is generally meant by spatio-temporal: but the exact classification of centers of gravity isn’t that important to me. I’m not claiming to have the details of that figured out.
You seem to be assuming that by “reifying” I must mean “treat as concretely existent”.
Oh come on now. That’s literally what the word means. It’s the dictionary definition. Don’t complain about me assuming things if you’re using words contrary to their dictionary definition and not explaining what you mean.
In context, what I mean is “treat as being existent in whatever sense Platonists think abstracta are existent”.
As I’ve said a thousand times I think all there is to “being existent” is to be an entity quantified over in our best scientific theories. So in this case treating abstract objects as being existent requires scientists to literally do nothing different.
I am not sure what you mean by that. The difference is about ontology. If two theories make the same predictions, and one of them has more entities, one of them is multiplying entities unnecessarily.
Neither nominalism nor platonism make predictions. Scientific theories make predictions and there are no nominalist scientific theories.
The Quinean approach incorrectly takes a scientific theory to be a formalism. It is only methodologicaly simpler to reify whatever is quantified over, formally, but that approach is too simple because it leaves out the semantics of physics—it doensn’t distinguish between f=ma and p=qr.
Honestly, I don’t see how this is relevant. I don’t agree that the Quinean approach leaves out the semantics of physics and I don’t see how including the semantics would let you have a simple scientific theory that didn’t reference abstract objects.
Such details are what could bring Platonism down.
Obviously it is possible that there are arguments that could convince me I’m wrong. I’m not obligated to have a preemptive reply to all of them.
As I’ve said a thousand times I think all there is to “being existent” is to be an entity quantified over in our best scientific theories.
The point of Quinean Platonism is to inflate the formal criterion of quantification into an ontological claim of existence, not to deflate existence into a mere formalism.
So in this case treating abstract objects as being existent requires scientists to literally do nothing different.
It requries them to ignore part of the informal interpretation of a theory.
Neither nominalism nor platonism make predictions.
Then one of them is unnecessarily complicated as an ontology. You see to think Platonism isn’t ontology. I have no idea what your would then think it is.
there are no nominalist scientific theories.
Whether theories are nominalist, or whatever, depends on how you read them. They don’t have their own
interpretation built-in, as I have pointed out a 1000 times.
I don’t agree that the Quinean approach leaves out the semantics of physics a
nd I don’t see how including the semantics would let you have a simple scientific theory that didn’t reference abstract objects.
Theories can include numbers and centers of gravity, and reference them in that sense, and that is not
the slightest argument for Platonism. Platonism requires that certain symbols have real referents—whichis another sense of “reference”.
Looking
at a symbol on a piece of paper doesn’t tell you that the symbol has a real referent. Non-Platonism isnt the claim that such symbols need to be deleted, it is an interpretation whereby some symbols get reified—have real world referents—and others don’t. Platonism is not the claim that there are abstract symbols in formalisms, it is an ontological claim about what exists.
There has to be some content to Platonism. You seem to be assuming that by “reifying” I must mean “treat as concretely existent”. In context, what I mean is “treat as being existent in whatever sense Platonists think abstracta are existent”. I am not sure what that is, but there has to be something to it, or there is no content to Platonism, and in any case it is not my job to explain it.
I am not sure what you mean by that. The difference is about ontology. If two theories make the same predictions, and one of them has more entities, one of them is multiplying entities unnecessarily.
And I have replied to the reply. The Quinean approach incorrectly takes a scientific theory to be a formalism. It is only methodologicaly simpler to reify whatever is quantified over, formally, but that approach is too simple because it leaves out the semantics of physics—it doensn’t distinguish between f=ma and p=qr.
Such details are what could bring Platonism down.
Oh come on now. That’s literally what the word means. It’s the dictionary definition. Don’t complain about me assuming things if you’re using words contrary to their dictionary definition and not explaining what you mean.
As I’ve said a thousand times I think all there is to “being existent” is to be an entity quantified over in our best scientific theories. So in this case treating abstract objects as being existent requires scientists to literally do nothing different.
Neither nominalism nor platonism make predictions. Scientific theories make predictions and there are no nominalist scientific theories.
Honestly, I don’t see how this is relevant. I don’t agree that the Quinean approach leaves out the semantics of physics and I don’t see how including the semantics would let you have a simple scientific theory that didn’t reference abstract objects.
Obviously it is possible that there are arguments that could convince me I’m wrong. I’m not obligated to have a preemptive reply to all of them.
The point of Quinean Platonism is to inflate the formal criterion of quantification into an ontological claim of existence, not to deflate existence into a mere formalism.
It requries them to ignore part of the informal interpretation of a theory.
Then one of them is unnecessarily complicated as an ontology. You see to think Platonism isn’t ontology. I have no idea what your would then think it is.
Whether theories are nominalist, or whatever, depends on how you read them. They don’t have their own interpretation built-in, as I have pointed out a 1000 times.
Theories can include numbers and centers of gravity, and reference them in that sense, and that is not the slightest argument for Platonism. Platonism requires that certain symbols have real referents—whichis another sense of “reference”.
Looking at a symbol on a piece of paper doesn’t tell you that the symbol has a real referent. Non-Platonism isnt the claim that such symbols need to be deleted, it is an interpretation whereby some symbols get reified—have real world referents—and others don’t. Platonism is not the claim that there are abstract symbols in formalisms, it is an ontological claim about what exists.