Being uncertain about the truth-value a moral proposition is quite compatible with moral realism.
And only compatible with non-relativistic moral cognitivism. If moral propositions can’t be false, there’s nothing to be uncertain about. If a moral truth just amounts to my belief or my society’s belief, and I know what that belief is (which I do), then again uncertainty is out of place.
I may be misunderstanding you, but it seems I have the same objection to this assertion that I raised here. That is, I don’t necessarily know my own moral beliefs, let alone my society’s. (Of course, that’s not to say that you don’t; if all you meant by “which I do” was a claim about torekp’s knowledge, I withdraw my objection.)
And only compatible with non-relativistic moral cognitivism. If moral propositions can’t be false, there’s nothing to be uncertain about. If a moral truth just amounts to my belief or my society’s belief, and I know what that belief is (which I do), then again uncertainty is out of place.
I may be misunderstanding you, but it seems I have the same objection to this assertion that I raised here. That is, I don’t necessarily know my own moral beliefs, let alone my society’s. (Of course, that’s not to say that you don’t; if all you meant by “which I do” was a claim about torekp’s knowledge, I withdraw my objection.)