You seem to be assuming that we live in the real world. If our physics is just a part of someone’s simulation, there is no particular reason why it would be a typical representation of the way things work for most people in the multiverse.
Let me give an example. I can write a novel, and some of the characters in the novel can also write novels. Even more, I can write a novel containing the sentence, “Michael wrote a novel containing an indefinite series of authors writing novels containing authors.” In other words, the “physics” of being a character in a novel does not require limited resources, and does not imply any limitation in the series of simulations.
When people have these kinds of discussions, I regularly see the assumption that even if there are lower level worlds that work in some other way, the top level has to operate with our physics. In other words the assumption is that we are in the real world. If we are not, the top level might be quite different. The top level might even be a fundamental, omnipotent mind (you may suppose this is impossible but that may just be the limitation of your simulated physics) who can create a world by thought alone.
Yes, there s an assumption of basic qualitative similarly between embedded and embedfng universes in this and most other simulation arguments. But if you have reason to believe you might be simulated’ you have to believe you could have been fooled about physics, maths computation’ …
Computational complexity would seem to provide a limitation deeper than mere physics. The sentence “John did a huge amount of computation” doesn’t perform any computation. It doesn’t do any work of any kind, except as interpreted by some reader via their own computations.
if the basis of this whole line of reasoning is anthropics on steroids, then the fact that our universe is limited by computational complexity does imply that other places in the multiverse will, too. In fact, if computational-complexity limits on computation weren’t universal, than the vast majority of measure would be in worlds without such limits, since those universes could host arbitrarily more stuff. And yet we find ourselves in this world.
You seem to be assuming that we live in the real world. If our physics is just a part of someone’s simulation, there is no particular reason why it would be a typical representation of the way things work for most people in the multiverse.
Let me give an example. I can write a novel, and some of the characters in the novel can also write novels. Even more, I can write a novel containing the sentence, “Michael wrote a novel containing an indefinite series of authors writing novels containing authors.” In other words, the “physics” of being a character in a novel does not require limited resources, and does not imply any limitation in the series of simulations.
When people have these kinds of discussions, I regularly see the assumption that even if there are lower level worlds that work in some other way, the top level has to operate with our physics. In other words the assumption is that we are in the real world. If we are not, the top level might be quite different. The top level might even be a fundamental, omnipotent mind (you may suppose this is impossible but that may just be the limitation of your simulated physics) who can create a world by thought alone.
Conventionally called “God”.
It’s funny how LW keeps reinventing theology.
Hmm, interesting, would this be the Accidental Ontological argument?
All things have causes:
Induction/Reality is subtly broken, stranding (at least) one thing from the causal chain:
God(s) exist(s).
Yes, there s an assumption of basic qualitative similarly between embedded and embedfng universes in this and most other simulation arguments. But if you have reason to believe you might be simulated’ you have to believe you could have been fooled about physics, maths computation’ …
Computational complexity would seem to provide a limitation deeper than mere physics. The sentence “John did a huge amount of computation” doesn’t perform any computation. It doesn’t do any work of any kind, except as interpreted by some reader via their own computations.
if the basis of this whole line of reasoning is anthropics on steroids, then the fact that our universe is limited by computational complexity does imply that other places in the multiverse will, too. In fact, if computational-complexity limits on computation weren’t universal, than the vast majority of measure would be in worlds without such limits, since those universes could host arbitrarily more stuff. And yet we find ourselves in this world.