Flip it the same way every time, and it will land the same way every time.
You are assuming determinism. Determinism is not known to be true.
because as long as it’s logically possible to conceptualize of a world that’s deterministic, we’d need a theory of probability that works in that world.
Yes, a theory of subjective probability would be useful in any world except one that allows complete omniscience—Knightian uncertainty is always with us. But it doesn’t follow from that that probability “is” subjective, because it doesn’t follow that probability isn’t objective as well.
Subjective and objective probability are not exclusive.
The traditional interpretation of probability is known as frequentist probability. Under this interpretation, items have some intrinsic “quality” of being some % likely to do one thing vs. another.
No, frequentist probability just says that events fall into sets of a comparable type which have relative frequencies. You don’t need to assume indeterminism for frequentism.
It’s obvious once you think about it for a moment that guessing is a valid way of generating probabilistic statements; we do it all the time.
It’s also obvious that historically observed frequencies, where available, are a good basis for a guess—better than nothing anyway. You were using them yourself , in the example about the presidents.
One of the things that tells us is that frequentism and Bayesianism aren’t mutually exclusive, either.
You are assuming determinism. Determinism is not known to be true.
Yes, a theory of subjective probability would be useful in any world except one that allows complete omniscience—Knightian uncertainty is always with us. But it doesn’t follow from that that probability “is” subjective, because it doesn’t follow that probability isn’t objective as well. Subjective and objective probability are not exclusive.
No, frequentist probability just says that events fall into sets of a comparable type which have relative frequencies. You don’t need to assume indeterminism for frequentism.
It’s also obvious that historically observed frequencies, where available, are a good basis for a guess—better than nothing anyway. You were using them yourself , in the example about the presidents.
One of the things that tells us is that frequentism and Bayesianism aren’t mutually exclusive, either.