Thanks for the suggestion, but I’ve read them all. It seems to me you are perhaps talking about reductionism, which admittedly is a related issue, but even reductionists don’t need to believe that the simulation of a thing equals the thing simulated.
I do wonder if you’ve read http://lesswrong.com/lw/qr/timeless_causality/ . If Eliezer himself is holding onto the concept of “computation” (and “anticipation” too), what makes you think that any of the other sequences he wrote dissolves that term?
Thanks for the suggestion, but I’ve read them all.
Well, that won’t do any good unless you also apply them to the topic at hand.
even reductionists don’t need to believe that the simulation of a thing equals the thing simulated.
That depends entirely on what you mean by the words… which you haven’t actually defined, as far as I can tell.
You also seem to think I’m arguing some particular position about consciousness or the simulability thereof, but that isn’t actually so. I am only attempting to dispel confusion, and that’s a very different thing.
I’ve been saying only that someone who claims that there is some mysterious thing that prevents consciousness from being simulated, is going to have to reduce a coherent definition of both “simulate” and “consciousness” in order to be able to say something that isn’t nonsensical, because both of those notions are tied too strongly to inbuilt biases and intuitions.
That is, anything you try to say about this subject without a proper reduction is almost bound to be confused rubbish, sprinkled with repeated instances of the mind projection fallacy.
If Eliezer himself is holding onto the concept of “computation”
I rather doubt it, since that article says:
Such causal links could be required for “computation” and “consciousness”—whatever those are.
AFAICT, the article is silent on these points, having nothing in particular to say about such vague concepts… in much the same way that Eliezer leaves open the future definition of a “non-person predicate”.
Thanks for the suggestion, but I’ve read them all. It seems to me you are perhaps talking about reductionism, which admittedly is a related issue, but even reductionists don’t need to believe that the simulation of a thing equals the thing simulated.
I do wonder if you’ve read http://lesswrong.com/lw/qr/timeless_causality/ . If Eliezer himself is holding onto the concept of “computation” (and “anticipation” too), what makes you think that any of the other sequences he wrote dissolves that term?
Well, that won’t do any good unless you also apply them to the topic at hand.
That depends entirely on what you mean by the words… which you haven’t actually defined, as far as I can tell.
You also seem to think I’m arguing some particular position about consciousness or the simulability thereof, but that isn’t actually so. I am only attempting to dispel confusion, and that’s a very different thing.
I’ve been saying only that someone who claims that there is some mysterious thing that prevents consciousness from being simulated, is going to have to reduce a coherent definition of both “simulate” and “consciousness” in order to be able to say something that isn’t nonsensical, because both of those notions are tied too strongly to inbuilt biases and intuitions.
That is, anything you try to say about this subject without a proper reduction is almost bound to be confused rubbish, sprinkled with repeated instances of the mind projection fallacy.
I rather doubt it, since that article says:
AFAICT, the article is silent on these points, having nothing in particular to say about such vague concepts… in much the same way that Eliezer leaves open the future definition of a “non-person predicate”.