To which the glib answer is “that’s because it isn’t true”.
″ I’m forced to site philosophers who are opposed to it because they seem to be the only ones willing to actually define it in a concise way. I’ll just reference this essay by Dennett to start with.
Dennett gives a concise definition because he has the same simplistic take on the subject as you. What he is not doing is showing that there is an actually group of people who describe themselves as postmodernists, and have those views. The use of the terms “postmodernist” is a bad sign: it’s a tern that works like “infidel” and so on, a label for an outgroup, and an ingroup’s views on an outgroup are rarely bedrock reality.
On the other hand, refraining from condemning others when you have skeletons in your own closet is easy.
I’m not sure I understand what you’re referring to here.
When we, the ingroup, can’t define something it’s Ok, when they, the outgroup, can’t define something, it shows how bad they are.
For instance, when you tell outsiders that you have wonderful answers to problems X, Y and Z, but you concede to people inside the tent that you actually don’t.
That’s called lying.
People are quite psychologically capable of having compartmentalised beliefs, that sort of thing is pretty ubiquitous, which is why I was able to find an example from the rationalist community itself. Relativism without contextualisation probably doesn’t make much sense, but who is proposing it?
There’s no such thing as postmodernism
You know exactly what I mean when I use that term, otherwise there would be no discussion.
As you surely know that I mean there is no group of people who both call themselves postmodernists and hold
the views you are attributing to postmodernists.
It seems that you can’t even name it without someone saying that’s not what it’s called, it actually doesn’t have a definition, every philosopher who is labeled a postmodernist called it something else, etc.
It’s kind of diffuse. But you can talk about scepticism, relativism, etc, if those are the issues.
If I can’t define it, there’s no point in discussing it. But it doesn’t change the fact that the way the mainstream left has absorbed the philosophy has been in the “there is no objective truth” / “all cultures/beliefs/creeds are equal” sense.
There’s some terrible epistemology on the left, and on the right, and even in rationalism.
My position is more about doing rationality right than not doing it all. If you critically apply rationality to itself, you end up with something a lot less elf confident and exclusionary than Bay Area rationalism.
I’d like to hear more about this. By “Bay Area rationalism”, I assume you are talking about a specific list of beliefs like the likelihood of intelligence explosion? Or are you talking about the Bayesian methodology in general?
I mean Yudkowsky’s approach. Which flies under the flag of Bayesianism, but doesn’t make much use of formal Bayesianism.
To which the glib answer is “that’s because it isn’t true”.
Dennett gives a concise definition because he has the same simplistic take on the subject as you. What he is not doing is showing that there is an actually group of people who describe themselves as postmodernists, and have those views. The use of the terms “postmodernist” is a bad sign: it’s a tern that works like “infidel” and so on, a label for an outgroup, and an ingroup’s views on an outgroup are rarely bedrock reality.
When we, the ingroup, can’t define something it’s Ok, when they, the outgroup, can’t define something, it shows how bad they are.
People are quite psychologically capable of having compartmentalised beliefs, that sort of thing is pretty ubiquitous, which is why I was able to find an example from the rationalist community itself. Relativism without contextualisation probably doesn’t make much sense, but who is proposing it?
As you surely know that I mean there is no group of people who both call themselves postmodernists and hold the views you are attributing to postmodernists.
It’s kind of diffuse. But you can talk about scepticism, relativism, etc, if those are the issues.
There’s some terrible epistemology on the left, and on the right, and even in rationalism.
I mean Yudkowsky’s approach. Which flies under the flag of Bayesianism, but doesn’t make much use of formal Bayesianism.