What? Of course Elias has some reason for believing what he believes.
Unless those reasons are justified—which we cannot know without knowing them—they cannot be held to be justifiable statements.
This is tautological.
Claiming that they must be equal is just really peculiar.
Not at all. You simply aren’t grasping why it is so. This is because you are thinking in terms of predictions and not in terms of concrete instances. To you, these are one-and-the-same, as you are used to thinking in the Bayesian probabilistic-belief manner.
I am telling you that this is an instance where that manner is flawed.
In your interactions with people here I haven’t observed p(Logos01 is persuaded by X | X is sound reasoning) to be especially high.
What you hold to be sound reasoning and what actually is sound reasoning are not equivalent.
As such I cannot be expected to consider “Logos01 is not persuaded by something” to give much information at all about the soundness of a claim.
If I had meant to imply that conclusion I would have phrased it so.
Unless those reasons are justified—which we cannot know without knowing them—they cannot be held to be justifiable statements.
This is tautological.
Not at all. You simply aren’t grasping why it is so. This is because you are thinking in terms of predictions and not in terms of concrete instances. To you, these are one-and-the-same, as you are used to thinking in the Bayesian probabilistic-belief manner.
I am telling you that this is an instance where that manner is flawed.
What you hold to be sound reasoning and what actually is sound reasoning are not equivalent.
If I had meant to imply that conclusion I would have phrased it so.