You know, for a moment until I saw who it was who was replying, I had a brief flash of hope that this conversation had actually started to get somewhere.
This is starting to hurt my feelings, guys. This is my earnest attempt to restate this.
Put another way: the statement “the map is not the territory” does not have a confidence value of .99999whatever. It is a statement about the map, which is itself a territory, and is simply true.
(I may, of course, be mistaken about Logos’ epistemology, in which case I would appreciate clarification.)
Well, you can take “the map is not the territory” as a premise of a system of beliefs, and assign it a probability of 1 within that system, but you should not assign a probability of 1 to the system of beliefs being true.
Of course, there are some uncertainties that it makes essentially no sense to condition your behavior on. What if everything is wrong and nothing makes sense? Then kabumfuck nothing, you do the best with what you have.
First, I want to note the tone you used. I have not so disrespected you in this dialogue.
Second: “Put another way: the statement “the map is not the territory” does not have a confidence value of .99999whatever. It is a statement about the map, which is itself a territory, and is simply true.”
There is some truth to the claim that “the map is a territory”, but it’s not really very useful. Also, while it is demonstrable that the map is not the territory, it is not tautological and thus requires demonstration.
I am, however, comfortable stating that any specific individual “map” which has been so demonstrated to be a territory of its own without being the territory for which it is mapping is, in truth, a territory of its own (caveat: thar be recursion here!), and that this is expressible as a truth claim without the need for probability values.
First, I have no idea what you’re talking about. I intended no disrespect (in this comment). What about my comment indicated to you a negative tone? I am honestly surprised that you would interpret it this way, and wish to correct whatever flaw in my communicatory ability has caused this.
Second:
There is some truth to the claim that “the map is a territory”, but it’s not really very useful.
Okay, now I’m starting to get confused again. ‘Some’ truth? And what does ‘useful’ have to do with it?
Also, while it is demonstrable that the map is not the territory, it is not tautological and thus requires demonstration.
It… seems tautological to me...
I am, however, comfortable stating that any specific individual “map” which has been so demonstrated … is, in truth, a territory of its own …, and that this is expressible as a truth claim without the need for probability values.
What about my comment indicated to you a negative tone?
The way I read “This is starting to hurt my feelings, guys.” was that you were expressing it as a miming of myself, as opposed to being indicative of your own sentiments. If this was not the case, then I apologize for the projection.
Okay, now I’m starting to get confused again. ‘Some’ truth? And what does ‘useful’ have to do with it?
Whether or not a truth claim is valid is binary. How far that a given valid claim extends is quantitative rather than qualitative, however. My comment towards usefulness has more to do with the utility of the notion, (I.e.; a true-and-interesting notion is more “useful” than a true-and-trivial notion.)
It… seems tautological to me...
Tautological would be “The map is a map”. Statements that depend upon definitions for their truth value approach tautology but aren’t necessarily so.¬A != A is tautological, as is A=A. However, B⇔A → ¬A = ¬B is definitionally true. So; “the map is not the territory” is definitionally true (and by its definition it is demonstrated). However, it is possible for a conceptual territory that the territory is the map. (I am aware of no such instance, but it conceptually could occur). This would, however, require a different operational definition of what a “map” is from the context we currently use, so it would actually be a different statement.
So, um, have I understood you or not?
I’m comfortable saying “close enough for government work”.
was a direct (and, in point of fact, honest) response to
You know, for a moment until I saw who it was who was replying, I had a brief flash of hope that this conversation had actually started to get somewhere.
Though, in retrospect, this may not mean what I took it to mean.
(I.e.; a true-and-interesting notion is more “useful” than a true-and-trivial notion.)
Agreed.
So; “the map is not the territory” is definitionally true (and by its definition it is demonstrated). However, it is possible for a conceptual territory that the territory is the map. … This would, however, require a different operational definition of what a “map” is from the context we currently use, so it would actually be a different statement.
Ah, ok.
I’m comfortable saying “close enough for government work”.
You know, for a moment until I saw who it was who was replying, I had a brief flash of hope that this conversation had actually started to get somewhere.
This is starting to hurt my feelings, guys. This is my earnest attempt to restate this.
Put another way: the statement “the map is not the territory” does not have a confidence value of .99999whatever. It is a statement about the map, which is itself a territory, and is simply true.
(I may, of course, be mistaken about Logos’ epistemology, in which case I would appreciate clarification.)
Well, you can take “the map is not the territory” as a premise of a system of beliefs, and assign it a probability of 1 within that system, but you should not assign a probability of 1 to the system of beliefs being true.
Of course, there are some uncertainties that it makes essentially no sense to condition your behavior on. What if everything is wrong and nothing makes sense? Then kabumfuck nothing, you do the best with what you have.
First, I want to note the tone you used. I have not so disrespected you in this dialogue.
Second: “Put another way: the statement “the map is not the territory” does not have a confidence value of .99999whatever. It is a statement about the map, which is itself a territory, and is simply true.”
There is some truth to the claim that “the map is a territory”, but it’s not really very useful. Also, while it is demonstrable that the map is not the territory, it is not tautological and thus requires demonstration.
I am, however, comfortable stating that any specific individual “map” which has been so demonstrated to be a territory of its own without being the territory for which it is mapping is, in truth, a territory of its own (caveat: thar be recursion here!), and that this is expressible as a truth claim without the need for probability values.
First, I have no idea what you’re talking about. I intended no disrespect (in this comment). What about my comment indicated to you a negative tone? I am honestly surprised that you would interpret it this way, and wish to correct whatever flaw in my communicatory ability has caused this.
Second:
Okay, now I’m starting to get confused again. ‘Some’ truth? And what does ‘useful’ have to do with it?
It… seems tautological to me...
So, um, have I understood you or not?
The way I read “This is starting to hurt my feelings, guys.” was that you were expressing it as a miming of myself, as opposed to being indicative of your own sentiments. If this was not the case, then I apologize for the projection.
Whether or not a truth claim is valid is binary. How far that a given valid claim extends is quantitative rather than qualitative, however. My comment towards usefulness has more to do with the utility of the notion, (I.e.; a true-and-interesting notion is more “useful” than a true-and-trivial notion.)
Tautological would be “The map is a map”. Statements that depend upon definitions for their truth value approach tautology but aren’t necessarily so.
¬A != Ais tautological, as isA=A. However,B⇔A → ¬A = ¬Bis definitionally true. So; “the map is not the territory” is definitionally true (and by its definition it is demonstrated). However, it is possible for a conceptual territory that the territory is the map. (I am aware of no such instance, but it conceptually could occur). This would, however, require a different operational definition of what a “map” is from the context we currently use, so it would actually be a different statement.I’m comfortable saying “close enough for government work”.
was a direct (and, in point of fact, honest) response to
Though, in retrospect, this may not mean what I took it to mean.
Agreed.
Ah, ok.
:)