He is not arguing that reality is subjective or anything like that.
I didn’t say he was.
On the other hand, your argument seems to be that we need to have some kind of surefire knowledge in epistemology because Bayesian probabilities are insufficient.
No. I was saying that Bayesian probabilistic-belief methodologies are effective at generating maps but they say almost nothing about how those maps correlate to the territory. And that it is, basically, possible to make those assertions. The practices are not the same, and that is the key difference.
What have you read or seen that makes you think this is the case?
It is fundamental to the nature of Bayesian belief-networks that they always assert statements in the form of probabilities. It is impossible to state a Bayesian belief except in the form of a probability.
From this there is a necessary conclusion.
Everyone in this thread is using the term to mean “statement or piece of knowledge to which you assign some level of truth value.” Saying “I believe X” is the same as saying “I think X is probably true.” Is this also how you’re using the term?
No. There is a difference categorically between the position, “I believe X is probably true” and “I believe X is true.”
I was saying that Bayesian probabilistic-belief methodologies are effective at generating maps but they say almost nothing about how those maps correlate to the territory.
It is fundamental to the nature of Bayesian belief-networks that they always assert statements in the form of probabilities. It is impossible to state a Bayesian belief except in the form of a probability.
Right. So why do you think this is insufficient for making maps that correlate to the territory? What assertions do you want to make about the territory that are not captured by this model?
No. There is a difference categorically between the position, “I believe X is probably true” and “I believe X is true.”
Right, but on LW “I believe X” is generally meant as the former, not the latter. This is probably part of the reason for all of the confusion and disagreement in this thread.
I didn’t say he was.
No. I was saying that Bayesian probabilistic-belief methodologies are effective at generating maps but they say almost nothing about how those maps correlate to the territory. And that it is, basically, possible to make those assertions. The practices are not the same, and that is the key difference.
It is fundamental to the nature of Bayesian belief-networks that they always assert statements in the form of probabilities. It is impossible to state a Bayesian belief except in the form of a probability.
From this there is a necessary conclusion.
No. There is a difference categorically between the position, “I believe X is probably true” and “I believe X is true.”
What does this mean?
Right. So why do you think this is insufficient for making maps that correlate to the territory? What assertions do you want to make about the territory that are not captured by this model?
Right, but on LW “I believe X” is generally meant as the former, not the latter. This is probably part of the reason for all of the confusion and disagreement in this thread.